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I. INTRODUCTION
Making generalizations about the law is often a risky proposition
but there is one generalization that can be safely made. The law is
constantly changing and evolving. While a manufacturer was once lia-
ble only if he negligently designed or manufactured a product, that is
no longer true.' Likewise, while an employer could once discharge an
at-will employee with complete impunity, that is no longer true.2
Although we recognize that our substantive rules are continually
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.A., Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1977; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1980. The
author would like to express his sincere appreciation to Professor Peter T. Hoff-
man of the University of Nebraska College of Law for focusing the author's atten-
tion on the problem discussed in this Article.
1. Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 436, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606-07 (1971).
2. Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 832-33, 387 N.W.2d 692,
694-95 (1986).
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evolving, we sometimes forget that our procedural rules are also
evolving. Substance and procedure are inextricably intertwined. For
example, recognizing that a terminated employee may have a cause of
action for wrongful discharge in turn requires the development of a
clear set of requirements for pleading that cause of action. Because
pleading requirements are more the product of judicial decisionsthan
of statutory pronouncements,3 developing those requirements inevita-
bly takes time. Each case adds something new to the pleading puz-
zle-clarifying and building on what had come before-and it may be
years before the puzzle begins to take on a recognizable shape.
The process of evolution in pleading is not limited to new causes of
action. We are continually refining and modifying the requirements
for pleading even long-standing causes of action. For example, it was
only a few months ago that the Nebraska Supreme Court put to rest a
twenty year conflict in its own decisions and specifically held that in-
tent to deceive is not an element of a cause of action for fraud.4 Thir-
teen years ago, a plaintiff who planned to file suit against a county
prosecutor for false imprisonment would have searched the digests in
vain for a case discussing whether malice is an essential element of the
cause of action and, if so, whether a general allegation of malice would
be sufficient. The court first addressed those issues in 1974.5 We now
know that mitigation of damages is not a subject that the plaintiff
need address in his petition; it is instead an affirmative defense that
the defendant must specifically plead. That unqualified statement
could not have been made four years ago, however. The court first
addressed the issue in 1983.6
The problem with change and evolution in pleading is that some-
one has to go first. The issue of whether a particular allegation is an
essential element of a cause of action is not a question that will be
decided in the abstract. It will instead be decided in a specific case
involving the sufficiency of the allegations in a specific petition.
Although the case will establish a precedent for future pleaders, the
first pleader will have no precedent to guide him. Nevertheless, if his
petition fails to comply with the new pleading requirement that the
3. Although there are a handful of statutes dealing with specialized pleading re-
quirements, see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-836 (1985) (compliance with conditions
precedent may be pleaded generally), the only statute that addresses the plain-
tiff's basic pleading obligation is § 25-804 which provides: 'The petition must con-
tain... a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language, and without repetition.... ." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-804 (1985).
That vague statutory pronouncement provides very little in the way of concrete
guidance. See infra text accompanying notes 15-28. Judicial opinions are what
define the elements of a particular cause of action and indicate how those ele-
ments should be pled. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
4. Nielsen v. Adams, 223 Neb. 262, 271-72, 388 N.W.2d 840, 845-46 (1986).
5. Koch v. Grimminger, 192 Neb. 706, 714, 223 N.W.2d 833, 837 (1974).
6. Maricle v. Spiegel, 213 Neb. 223, 230, 329 N.W.2d 80, 86 (1983).
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court announces, the case is over irrespective of whether the pleader
could meet that newly announced requirement. In other words, he
loses-not because his action is without merit but because he failed to
comply with a pleading requirement that he could not have reasonably
foreseen.
That should change. After discussing the practical difficulties that
Nebraska pleaders face on a daily basis,7 this Article will analyze the
interrelationship between the Nebraska pleading system and the ex-
panding reach of res judicata.8 That interrelationship suggests that
the court should modify its current approach to pleading appeals in
order to ensure that cases are decided on their merits rather than on
the technicalities of pleading. More specifically, the court should re-
mand with leave to amend when the petition fails to comply with a
newly announced pleading requirement 9 and should also discontinue
its practice of affirming pleading appeals on grounds other than those
7. See infra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 85-131 and accompanying text. The remand standard proposed in
this Article is very similar to the standard federal courts follow in determining
whether new rules of law should be given prospective effect. When announcing
new rules of laws, courts have the power to give those rules retroactive effect,
partial retroactive effect, or prospective effect. See, e.g., Great No. Ry. v. Sun-
burst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932); Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb.
183, 187, 141 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1966). At least on the federal level, the determina-
tion of what effect a new rule should have
[i]nvolves a three part analysis: (1) whether the appellate decision estab-
lished a new principle of law either by overruling past precedent which
had been relied upon or by deciding an issue of first impression in a man-
ner 'not clearly foreshadowed' [by earlier decisions]; (2) whether pro-
spective application will further or retard the [new] rule . . . ; and
(3) whether the rule if applied in this case would produce a "substantial
inequitable result."
LePatourel v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 264, 272 (D. Neb. 1978) (decision that
federal judge acting in an official but nonjudicial capacity while driving a car was
a federal employee within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act applied
prospectively because, inter alia, the decision addressed an issue that had never
been specifically addressed before and was, therefore, not clearly foreshadowed,
and it would be inequitable to deny plaintiffs any relief when they had no reason
to believe that the Act was potentially applicable, especially since the statute of
limitations had run); see, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1971)
(decision that state statute of limitations applies to actions brought under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act applied prospectively because it would be
fundamentally unfair to deprive the plaintiff of "any remedy whatsoever on the
basis of superseding legal doctrine that was quite unforeseeable").
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has occasionally given its decisions
prospective effect, the court has never clearly articulated the standard it follows.
The court has sometimes emphasized the financial hardship that retroactive ap-
plication would create for defendants, see Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430,
436, 160 N.W.2d 805, 809 (1968), at other times has emphasized that it was overrul-
ing precedent upon which the parties relied, see Langfeld v. Nebraska Dep't. of
Roads, 213 Neb. 15, 26, 328 N.W.2d 452, 458 (1983), and at still other times has
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relied on by the trial court.' 0
Because the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition can be indirectly
challenged on appeal by arguing that the plaintiff failed to introduce
sufficient evidence to prove each element of his cause of action, the
suggested remand standard should also be followed when adopting
new proof requirements."-
II. IF ONLY I KNEW WHAT TO PLEAD
Perhaps the greatest mystery that confronts a lawyer in a code
pleading12 jurisdiction like Nebraska3 is how to draft a proper peti-
emphasized that its decision was contrary to the past practices of the trial courts.
See Sosso v. Sosso, 196 Neb. 242, 244, 242 N.W.2d 621, 623 (1976).
The remand standard proposed in this Article parts company with traditional
retroactivity analysis in that the standard does not contemplate giving prospec-
tive effect to new rules of pleading or proof. Those rules would apply to the par-
ties, but the parties would be given an opportunity not currently available: the
opportunity to comply with pleading or proof requirements that they could not
reasonably have foreseen.
10. See infr notes 132-51 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 152-86 and accompanying text.
12. The term "code pleading" refers to the procedural system first adopted by New
York in 1848. The New York Code, which was subsequently adopted by federal
courts and most states, was primarily the work of David Dudley Field and is often
referred to as the "Field Code." See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING 22 (1947). The code blended law and equity into one procedural system
by abolishing the common law forms of action and substituting the civil action in
their place. J. POMEROY, CnvL REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY
THE CIviL ACTION 5-6 (5th ed. 1929); see, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-101 (1985).
In addition to merging law and equity, the code relaxed the common law re-
strictions on joinder of parties and claims, see C. CLARK, supra, at 23, 435-38, and
eliminated the extremely convoluted common law system of declarations, tra-
verses, pleas by way of confession and avoidance, rejoinders, rebutters, surrebut-
ters, and so on. In their place, the code substituted four pleadings: the petition,
the defendant's answer or demurrer, the plaintiff's reply or demurrer to new
matter contained in the defendant's answer, and the defendant's demurrer to
new matter in the plaintiff's reply. C. CLARK, supra, at 687-88; see, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-803 (1985). Finally, the code rejected the technical, formalistic,
and conclusory nature of common law pleading in favor of a fact-based pleading
system. In other words, the pleader's obligation under the code was to allege
facts, not to mimic technical formulas. See J. POMEROY, supra, at 610-13; see, e.g.,
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-804 (1985).
The nightmare of distinguishing law and fact soon led to proposals to replace
fact pleading with notice pleading. See, e.g., Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV.
L. REv. 501, 501-02 (1918). Those proposals were adopted by the federal system in
1938 with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)
provides that a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
Under Rule 8(a), the question is not whether the complaint alleges ultimate facts
sufficient to state a cause of action but whether it gives "the defendant fair notice
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion.14 The requirement of alleging facts sufficient to state a cause of
action 15 seems simple enough. The pleader need only allege the "dry,
naked, actual facts."16 Facts are not so easily divorced from law, how-
of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
There is sometimes a tendency to think that notice pleading and code pleading
are as different as day and night. That is not quite accurate. Just like a petition
in Nebraska state court, a complaint in federal court must include allegations
covering each element of the cause of action. The difference is that federal courts
are much more willing to infer that the necessary allegations have been made, to
accept generalized allegations, and to brush aside arguments that the allegations
are mere conclusions. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir.
1944).
A majority of the states have now adopted notice pleading. See J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 238 (1985). For further
discussion of notice pleading see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 1201-1312 (1969 & 1986 Supp.). For further discussion of code
pleading, see C. CLARK, supra, and for further discussion of common law plead-
ing, see B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING (3d ed. 1923).
13. Nebraska has been a code pleading jurisdiction since 1857. See C. CLARK, supra
note 12, at 24.
14. The mystery surrounds more than petitions. The requirement of pleading facts,
see infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text, is not limited to claims. It also ap-
plies to affirmative defenses, setoffs, counterclaims, and crossclaims. See New-
man Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178, 181-82, 302 N.W.2d 697, 700
(1981) (allegation that contract was the product of duress was a mere conclusion;
facts constituting an affirmative defense must be specifically pleaded in the an-
swer); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-811 (1985). Although this Article focuses on the peti-
tion, the remand standard it proposes would apply to all pleadings and parties.
15. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-804(2) (1985).
16. J. POMEROY, supra note 12, at 638. In his treatise, Pomeroy made what is gener-
ally considered to be the classic statement of a pleader's obligation under the
codes:
The issuable facts in a legal action, and the facts material to the relief in
an equitable suit, should not only be stated to the complete exclusion of
the law and the evidence, but they should be alleged as they actually
existed or occurred, and not their legal effect, force, or operation. This
conclusion follows as an evident corollary from the doctrine that the
rules of law and the legal rights and duties of the parties are to be as-
sumed, while the facts only which call these rules into operation, and are
the occasion of the rights and duties, are to spread upon the record.
Every attempt to combine fact and law, to give the facts a legal coloring
and aspect, to present them in their legal bearing upon the issues rather
than in their actual naked simplicity, is so far forth an averment of law
instead of fact, and is a direct violation of the principle upon which the
codes have constructed their system of pleading.
I& at 639-40. In addition to being utterly unworkable, see e.g., F. JAMEs & G.
HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (3d ed. 1985), Pomeroy's standard would sweep
away a number of convenient pleading shortcuts, including, for example, the
common counts.
Historically, the obligation of pleading facts did not mean pleading just any
facts. Ultimate facts were to pleaded, not evidentiary facts. See, e.g., Bee Publish-
ing Co. v. World Publishing Co., 59 Neb. 713, 718-19, 82 N.W. 28, 29 (1900); J.
POMEROY, supra note 12, at 635. The distinction between ultimate and eviden-
[Vol. 66:320
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ever, and many a pleader has fallen into the trap of substituting legal
conclusions for factual allegations.17
The distinction between law and fact is generally thought of as the
keystone of code pleading, but that thinking is not quite accurate. The
last thing that the drafters of the code were interested in creating was
a procedural trap that elevated form over substance. Code pleading
was a direct response to the rigidity and formalism of common law
pleading.' 8 By abolishing the forms of action and requiring a pleader
to allege facts, the drafters of the code sought to simplify pleading and
thereby ensure that cases would turn more on their merits than on
technicalities and tactical mistakes.19 From the standpoint of the
drafters, the pleader's primary obligation was to use "ordinary and
concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to en-
able a person of common understanding to know what is intended."20
Although it was originally hoped that code pleading would simplify
pleading to the point that "even a child could write a letter to the
tiary facts is obvious in the abstract. "An 'evidentiary' fact is one that furnishes
evidence of the existence of some other fact. An ultimate fact is the final result-
ing effect which is reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary
facts." Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Or. 349, 355,184 P. 487,
489 (1919) (citations omitted). But the distinction is anything but obvious in prac-
tice. See, e.g., Huber v. H.R. Douglas, Inc., 94 Conn. 167,184,108 A. 727, 733 (1919)
("the line of separation between that which is merely unnecessary description
and that which is essential in pleading, often becomes almost a lost boundary")
(citation omitted). The distinction no longer appears to be of practical signifi-
cance in Nebraska. There are no modern cases in which the court has found a
petition to be defective because it pleaded evidentiary as opposed to ultimate
facts.
17. See, e.g., Allen v. Lancaster County, 218 Neb. 163, 164, 352 N.W.2d 883, 884 (1984)
(allegation that sewer system permit did not conform with county resolution is a
legal conclusion); Roadrunner Dev., Inc. v. Sims, 213 Neb. 649, 652, 330 N.W.2d
915, 917 (1983) (allegation in class action is that it was impracticable to join all
interested parties is a legal conclusion); International Bd. of Elec. Workers Local
763 v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 209 Neb. 335, 342, 307 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1981)
(allegation that defendant failed to comply with an order of the Industrial Rela-
tions Commission is a legal conclusion); Koch v. Grimminger, 192 Neb. 706, 714,
223 N.W.2d 833, 837 (1974) (allegation that the defendant acted "maliciously, in-
tentionally, and recklessly" is a legal conclusion); Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 128 Neb. 13, 15, 257 N.W. 493, 494 (1934) (allegation that
plaintiff had no remedy at law is a legal conclusion); U.S. Theatre Supply Co. v.
Creal, 122 Neb. 743, 746, 241 N.W. 529, 530 (1932) (allegation that amounts are
now due and owing is a legal conclusion).
18. See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMSSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS (New
York) 73-74, 87, 123-24, 137-38, 140-41, 144 (1848) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
19. See, e.g., Manning v. School Dist. No. 6,124 Wis. 84, 91, 102 N.W. 356, 358 (1905); J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, supra note 12, at 237-38; F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 16, at 136; Costigan, The Spirit of Code Pleading, 11 ILL. L.
REV. 517, 517-19 (1917).
20. FIRST REPORT, supra note 18, at 147.
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court telling of its case,"21 those hopes were soon dashed. Despite the
drafters' emphasis on the use of ordinary, understandable language,
the courts began to focus exclusively on the distinction between ulti-
mate facts and legal conclusions.22 That in turn resurrected the very
kind of formalistic complexity that code pleading was designed to
eliminate and introduced a degree of uncertainty that has continued to
plague the system.
The distinction between law and fact is so unwieldy that a pleader
can never be sure whether a particular allegation is sufficient unless
there is a reported decision in his jurisdiction directly on point.23 Rea-
soning by analogy is of limited use, not only because decisions applying
the distinction have sometimes reached results that seem counterin-
tuitive,24 but also because the courts have never been able to articulate
a standard for determining whether a particular allegation falls into
the permissible category of pleading facts or into the impermissible
category of pleading conclusions of law.2 5
21. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459 (1942). For a delightful account of
how code pleading would have functioned if the courts had approached a petition
as though it were a letter, see Costigan, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 226-27; J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A.
MILLER, supra note 12, at 248-49; Costigan, supra note 19, at 520, 538.
23. See, e.g., Cook, "Facts"and "Statements of Fact" 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 245 (1937).
24. For example, an allegation that the defendant was negligent sounds very much
like a conclusion of law. It is instead an allegation of fact. See Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry. v. O'Donnell, 72 Neb. 900, 905, 101 N.W. 1009, 1010 (1904). By contrast, an
allegation that a physician was engaged in the practice of osteopathy sounds very
much like a fact. It is instead a conclusion of law. See State ex rel. Johnson v.
Wagner, 139 Neb. 471, 475, 297 N.W. 906, 909 (1941). Classifying a particular state-
ment as an allegation of fact or a conclusion of law is even more difficult that the
text suggests because the classification often depends on the context in which the
statement is made. See C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 232.
25. Some courts did try to articulate a standard for distinguishing ultimate facts from
conclusions of law. The most commonly articulated standard was that an ulti-
mate fact is a conclusion reached by natural reasoning whereas a conclusion of
law is a conclusion reached by artificial reasoning, i.e., by the application of a
fixed rule of law. See, e.g., Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847, 849,
234 N.W. 254, 256 (1931). That may well be a standard but it is by no means a
workable standard. As the California Supreme Court said:
The line of demarcation between what are questions of fact and conclu-
sions of law is not one easy to be drawn in all cases. It is quite easy to say
that the ultimate facts are but the logical conclusions deduced from cer-
tain primary facts evidentiary in their character, and that conclusions of
law are those presumptions or legal deductions which, the facts being
given, are drawn without further evidence. This does not, however,
quite meet the difficulty. We deduce the ultimate fact from certain pro-
bative facts by a process of natural reasoning. We draw the inference or
conclusion of law by a process of artificial reasoning, but this last process
is often in such exact accord with natural reason, that the distinction is
scarcely appreciable.
... Sanity or insanity, guilt, innocence, fraud, and negligence, are all
[Vol. 66:320
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The absence of any such standard is troublesome but understanda-
ble. When all is said and done, there is no inherent distinction be-
tween conclusions of law and allegations of fact. The only difference
between the two is that the second provides more detail than the first.
For example, an allegation that "Jack and Jill entered into a contract"
is insufficient to plead the existence of a binding contract supported by
valuable consideration. 26 The pleader must instead allege that "Jack
and Jill entered into a contract whereby Jack promised to sell Jill a
pail of water and Jill promised to pay Jack one dollar for said pail of
water." Neither of those allegations are allegations of "dry, naked, ac-
tual facts;" 27 they both plead facts according to their legal effect. The
only real difference between them is that the second allegation de-
scribes the terms of the contract. In other words, it provides more
information. Saying that a pleader has alleged a legal conclusion
rather than facts is simply another way of saying that a pleader has
failed to describe his claim in sufficient detail.28
Because the question of whether a petition is sufficiently detailed
facts, and whether their existence or nonexistence is reached by a pro-
cess of natural reasoning or artificial process known as "conclusion of
law" does not in the least alter their status as facts.
Levins v. Rovengo, 71 Cal. 273, 276-76, 12 P. 161, 162-63 (1886) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
Most courts simply threw up their hands and admitted that it is impossible to
formulate a governing standard for distinguishing the two. As the Minnesota
Supreme Court recognized, the distinction between conclusions of law and ulti-
mate facts is one based more on judicial fiat than on principle.
It may not be possible to formulate a definition that will always describe
what is a mere conclusion of law, so as to distinguish it from a pleadable,
ultimate fact, or that will define how great an infusion of conclusions of
law will be allowed to enter into the composition of a pleadable fact.
Precedent and analogy are our only guides. And it is undoubtedly true
that there will be found a want of entire judicial harmony in the adjudi-
cated cases as to what are statements of fact, and what are mere conclu-
sions of law. And in holding one class of inferences as facts to be
pleaded, and another as conclusions of law to be avoided, courts may
have been governed more by precedent than by a substantial difference
in principle.
Clark v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry., 28 Minn. 69, 71-72, 9 N.W. 75, 75-76 (1881).
26. In order to state a cause of action for breach of contract, the petition must allege
the existence of a contract, compliance with all conditions precedent, breach, and
resulting damage. See, e.g., Department of Banking & Finance v. Wilken, 217
Neb. 796, 799, 352 N.W.2d 145, 147 (1984). Alleging the first element, the exist-
ence of a contract, involves setting forth the terms of the contract. See, e.g.,
Heinzman v. Hall County, 213 Neb. 268, 270, 328 N.W.2d 764, 767 (1983); Bryant v.
Barton, 32 Neb. 613, 615, 49 N.W. 331, 332 (1891). It is not sufficient simply to
allege that the parties entered into a contract. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 12,
at 277-80.
27. J. POMEROY, supra note 12, at 640.
28. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 231-34; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note
16, at 140; Cook, supra note 23, at 241-44.
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is so case-specific, there are no definite rules to guide a pleader.2 9 Un-
less there is a reported decision addressing the precise allegation at
issue, the pleader is "left to blaze new paths through a trackless wil-
derness."30 The only advice anyone can give to a pleader who finds
himself blazing a new trail is to add more detail whenever he is unsure
about the sufficiency of a particular allegation.31 But no one-other
than a court-can tell him when enough is in fact enough or whether
the words he uses are in fact the words he should be using.32
In addition to the problem of not knowing how detailed each alle-
gation should be, a pleader may sometimes face an even more funda-
mental problem. He may not know what to plead. Saying that a
petition must allege each element of the cause of action does not an-
swer the question of what those elements are. The decision of what
must be pled in order to state a cause of action is a function of a
number of considerations, including the underlying substantive law,
convenience, access to information, and the probability of unfair sur-
prise.33 Because so many variables affect the burden of pleading, it is
impossible to formulate a general standard for determining the ele-
ments of a particular cause of action.34 We know what the elements of
29. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 234.
30. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 CoLum. L. REv. 416,423
(1921).
31. As Judge Clark said:
No rule of thumb is possible, but in general it may be said that the
pleader should not content himself with alleging merely the final and
ultimate conclusion which the court is to make in deciding the case for
him. He should go at least one step further back and allege the circum-
stances from which this conclusion directly followed.
C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 234 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
32. Because pleading rules tend to become extremely rigid and formalized over time,
see Clark, supra note 21, at 460, a petition that does in fact state a cause of action
may nevertheless be found defective if the allegations are not made in the way
the courts have grown accustomed to seeing them made. See Cook, supra note 30,
at 417. For an example of a case in which the plaintiff pled what she was required
to plead but not in the way the court expected, see Morris v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983).
33. See F. JAMs & G. HAZARD, supra note 16, at 143-49; Cleary, Presuming and
Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 10-14 (1959).
34. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 16, at 149. Although there have been at-
tempts to define the term, "cause of action," none of those attempts provide much
in the way of concrete guidance. For example, Pomeroy defined "cause of action"
as follows:
[E]very remedial right arises out of an antecedent primary right and cor-
responding duty and a delict or breach of such primary right and duty by
the person on whom the duty rests.... [T]he primary right and duty and
the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action in the legal
sense of the term, and as it is used in the codes of the several States....
The cause of action, as it appears in the complaint when properly
pleaded, will therefore always be the facts from which the plaintiff's pri-
mary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty have arisen,
[Vol. 66:320
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malicious prosecution are, for example, not because they can be de-
duced from some overreaching principle but because the court has told
us what they are.35 A pleader attempting to allege a cause of action in
an evolving area of law, however, does not have the luxury of prece-
dent. Realistically, all he can do is guess.36
The problem of knowing what to allege, and at what level of detail,
is compounded in Nebraska by the limited resources available to the
pleader. There are comparatively few reported pleading decisions in
Nebraska, in large part because only the supreme court issues written
opinions.37 Furthermore, unlike their counterparts in larger states
like California, Nebraska pleaders do not have a wealth of form books
to guide them.3 8 The only Nebraska practice encyclopedia is of rather
uneven quality and out of date.3 9
Pleading in Nebraska is therefore more of a challenge than a rou-
together with the facts which constitute the defendant's delict or act of
wrong.
J. POMEROY, supra note 12, at 527-28 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Suhr v. City of
Scribner, 207 Neb. 24, 26-27, 295 N.W.2d 302, 303 (1980). That is all well and good
but it does not answer the question of precisely what must be pled and at what
level of detail. The term "cause of action," like "many code terms, gives a prom-
ise of precision and definiteness, which is not fulfilled in reality." C. CLARK,
supra note 12, at 134.
35. Those elements are: (1) institution of a proceeding (2) by the defendant (3) with
malice (4) and without probable cause (5) that terminated in favor of the present
plaintiff (6) who was damaged as a result of the institution of the proceeding.
E.g., Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lincoln, 207 Neb. 521, 526, 300
N.W.2d 10, 14 (1980).
36. See F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 12, at 149 (in the absence of official forms
or judicial precedents, a pleader is left without useful guides for determining the
elements of a cause of action).
37. Nebraska county and district judges do not issue published opinions, and, unlike
so many other states, Nebraska has no intermediate court of appeals.
38. Like Nebraska, California is also a code pleading jurisdiction. See CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 425.10 (West 1973). Among the many resources available to a Cali-
fornia pleader are: K. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA CIVIL ACTIONS: PLEADING & PRAC-
TICE (1986); OwENs, CALIFORNIA FORMS & PROCEDURE (1983); B. WInaN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (1971 & 1986 Supp.).
39. That encyclopedia is W. MOORE, NEBRASKA PRACTICE (1976). The only other rel-
atively comprehensive form book published in the last 50 years to which a Ne-
braska pleader can turn is AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PLEADING AND PRACTICE
FORMS (1967). Although it can often be helpful, American Jursprudence is not
specifically tailored to Nebraska practice.
The last pocket part of NEBRASKA PRACTICE was issued in 1982. The law has
not remained stagnate since 1982, however. For example, the court has recog-
nized some limitations on the power of an employer to discharge an at-will em-
ployee, see Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388
(1983), and, not surprisingly, there has recently been a significant increase in the
number of wrongful discharge actions filed in Nebraska. See Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation with Dale E. Bock, Esq. (July 18, 1986) (on file in Rm.
213 at Univ. Neb. Law College). A pleader looking for guidance on how to allege
a cause of action for wrongful discharge, however, will find nothing in NEBRASKA
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tine task. No matter how careful a pleader may be, it is often ex-
tremely difficult to draft a petition that cannot be challenged for
failure to state a cause of action.40 In the absence of a clear supreme
court case on point, the trial court-like the pleader-is left without a
definitive benchmark against which to evaluate the petition's suffi-
ciency. It may decide that the petition makes all the necessary allega-
tions in sufficient detail to state a cause of action, but, then again, it
might not. Whatever the trial court decides, its disposition of the de-
murrer will not necessarily dispose of the case. If the trial court over-
rules the demurrer, the litigation will go forward.41 If the trial court
sustains the demurrer, the litigation may still go forward-provided,
of course, that the plaintiff correctly answers the $64,000 question.
A. To Appeal or to Amend-The $64,000 Question
When a demurrer to a petition is sustained for failure to state a
PRACTICE. The book does not even contain a form for pleading a simple breach of
contract.
40. See Dalton, Fact Pleading in Nebraska 2-3 (May 11, 1978) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file in Rm. 212 at Univ. Neb. College of Law). Because a plaintiff will
generally be given an opportunity to amend after a demurrer is sustained, assum-
ing that the defect is one that can be remedied by amendment, it seems fairly
obvious that demurrers are not always filed with an eye toward disposing of the
case. A good number of demurrers are instead filed to buy time and harass the
plaintiff. See Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Hon. Donald R.
Grant (Sept. 3, 1986) (on file in Rm. 213 at Univ. Neb. College of Law) (while
there are colorable grounds for one half of the demurrers filed, the grounds for
the other half are best described as "silly"). In addition to keeping the plaintiff
off balance, successive demurrers may serve another strategic purpose: forcing
the plaintiff to make an allegation that he cannot prove. By filing an amended
petition, the plaintiff waives any argument that the added allegation is not essen-
tial to his cause of action. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
Demurrers in Nebraska are classified as either special or general demurrers.
If the defendant seeks to demur on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, lack of capacity to sue, misjoinder of claims, misjoinder of parties, or a prior
pending action between the same parties for the same cause of action, he must
specify the ground when he demurs. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-806, 25-807 (1985).
Such a demurrer is classified as a special demurrer. If the defendant fails to spec-
ify the ground, the demurrer is treated as a demurrer on the ground that the
petition fails to state a cause of action. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-807 (1985). Such a
demurrer is classified as a general demurrer.
41. Theoretically, the defendant could immediately appeal the trial court's decision
by failing to answer and allowing a default judgment to be entered against him.
That is a rather dangerous course of action to follow. If the judgment is affirmed,
the defendant will not be allowed to answer; the case is over. See Estabrook v.
Hughes, 8 Neb. 496, 502, 1 N.W. 132, 134 (1879). There is no reason, however, for
the defendant to expose himself to that danger. Filing an answer and litigating
the case on the merits does not waive the right to challenge the sufficiency of the
petition on appeal. See Stitzel v. Hitchcock County, 139 Neb. 700, 702-03, 298 N.W.
555, 557 (1941); Sallander v. Prairie Life Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 629, 632, 200 N.W. 344,
345 (1924).
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cause of action, the plaintiff has a choice to make. He can either stand
on his petition and appeal the trial court's ruling or he can attempt to
cure the alleged defect by filing an amended petition.42 Unless the
trial court's ruling is clearly wrong-in which case the option to ap-
peal becomes rather attractive-or clearly right-in which case the op-
tion to amend becomes rather attractive-the decision of how to
respond is not an easy one to make. Both courses of action entail con-
siderable risks, some less obvious than others.
4 3
If the plaintiff elects to stand on his petition, his action will be dis-
missed and final judgment entered against him.44 The entire case will
then hinge on whether there is any ground upon which the trial court
could have properly sustained the demurrer, irrespective of whether
the trial court actually relied on that ground as the basis for its ruling.
Because the Nebraska Supreme Court has shown no hesitation in af-
firming decisions on grounds other than those invoked by the lower
court,45 a plaintiff must do more than simply evaluate the sufficiency
of his petition in light of whatever explanation the trial judge may
have given for sustaining the demurrer. The plaintiff must instead
play the devil's advocate and sift through the petition for any conceiv-
able defect before he can realistically make an informed decision on
the wisdom of appealing rather than amending.
The price of making a wrong decision in that regard is high. Once
the supreme court affirms, the case is over. The plaintiff will not be
given leave to amend, regardless of whether the defect in the petition
is one that could be easily remedied. Although appellate courts do
have the power to remand cases with instructions that the plaintiff be
given leave to amend the petition,46 they have traditionally refused to
exercise that power unless the lower court committed reversible er-
42. See Knapp v. City of Omaha, 175 Neb. 576, 122 N.W.2d 513, (1963); Hoffman v.
Geiger, 134 Neb. 643, 648, 279 N.W. 350, 353 (1938); R. Harnsberger, Pleading and
Jurisdiction 80 (1964) (mimeographed course materials) (on file in Rm. 172D at
the Univ. Neb. College of Law). Amendments following the sustaining of a de-
murrer are governed by § 25-854 which provides: "If the demurrer be sustained,
the adverse party may amend, if the defect can be remedied by way of amend-
ment, with or without costs, as the court in its discretion shall direct." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-854 (1985). Although § 25-854 does not confer an unqualified right to
amend, it comes very close to doing just that. The trial cannot sustain the demur-
rer without giving the plaintiff leave to amend unless it is clear that the defect
cannot be remedied. Cagle, Inc. v. Sammons, 198 Neb. 595, 604, 254 N.W.2d 398,
404 (1977).
43. The risks associated with amending a petition are discussed infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Parkin v. Parkin, 123 Neb. 836, 837, 244 N.W. 638, 639 (1932).
45. See, e.g., Harmon Care Centers, Inc. v. Knight, 215 Neb. 779, 783-84, 340 N.W.2d
872, 875 (1983).
46. That power can be exercised even though the trial court's decision was correct in
all respects. See Morearty v. City of McCook, 119 Neb. 202, 204-05, 228 N.W. 367,
368 (1929); Moseley v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 57 Neb. 636, 640, 78 N.W. 293, 294
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ror. In other words, most courts-and, more specifically, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court-will not reverse a judgment and remand the
case for the sole purpose of allowing the plaintiff to amend his petition
in order to state a cause of action.47
The traditional approach to pleading appeals-affirming the judg-
(1899); Humphries v. Spafford, 14 Neb. 488, 490, 16 N.W. 911, 912 (1883). One of
the sources of that power is NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-842 (1985) which provides:
The court may, either before or after judgment, in furtherance of justice,
and on such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading, process or
proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any party or by cor-
recting a mistake in the name of the party, or a mistake in any other
respect, or by inserting other allegations material to the case, or, when
the amendment does not change substantially the claim or defense, by
conforming the pleading or proceeding to the facts proved. Whenever
any proceeding taken by a party fails to conform, in any respect, to the
provisions of this code, the court may permit the same to be made con-
formable thereto by amendment.
IM This section has been most often invoked by the supreme court to amend
pleadings to conform to the evidence introduced at trial. See, e.g., Lippire v.
Eckel, 178 Neb. 643, 645-46, 134 N.W.2d 802, 805 (1965). There are cases holding
that NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-852 (1985) does not authorize the supreme court to en-
tertain a motion to amend when the court is exercising normal appellate jurisdic-
tion. See J. Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Nicholls, 52 Neb. 312, 313, 72 N.W. 217,
217 (1897). The cases in which the court has itself granted a motion to amend
have generally been equity cases, which are reviewed de novo. See, e.g., In re
Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 107, 177 Neb. 15, 26, 128 N.W.2d 121,128 (1964);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1925 (1985). When the court is exercising normal appellate
jurisdiction, the proper approach is to remand the case for the purpose of al-
lowing the trial court to amend the pleading. See J. Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co. v.
Nicholls, 52 Neb. 312, 314, 72 N.W. 217, 218 (1897); Humphries v. Spaffort, 14 Neb.
488, 490, 16 N.W. 911, 912 (1883).
Although the court has said that amendments after judgment should be al-
lowed only when the effect of doing so will be to sustain rather than reverse the
judgment, the court has also recognized that amendments which have the effect
of reversing a judgment may nevertheless be appropriate if necessary to prevent
a miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lincoln County, 92 Neb. 167, 178,
138 N.W. 122, 126 (1912).
47. See e.g., Roberge v. Cambridge Coop. Creamery, Co., 243 Minn. 230, 236, 67
N.W.2d 400, 404 (1954); A. Harris & Co. v. Cook, 62 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. Ct. App.
1933). Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has not specifically said that it will
not remand a case solely to allow a party to amend a petition, the court's disposi-
tion of pleading appeals leaves no doubt that the no-remand rule is followed in
Nebraska. See, e.g., Prososki v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 219 Neb. 607,
365 N.W.2d 427 (1985) (affirming judgment of dismissal); Smith v. Dewey, 214
Neb. 605, 335 N.W.2d 530 (1983) (same); Almarez v. Hartmann, 211 Neb. 243, 318
N.W.2d 98 (1982) (same); State Auto. & Cas. Under. v. Kline, 204 Neb. 414, 282
N.W.2d 601 (1979) (same); Koch v. Grimminger, 192 Neb. 706, 223 N.W.2d 833
(1974) (same); R. Harnsberger, supra note 42, at 80. The only discordant note in
this sea of affirmances was sounded long ago in Moseley v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.-R,
57 Neb. 637, 640, 78 N.W. 293, 294 (1899) (even though trial court committed no
error, remand is appropriate because plaintiff was mistaken as to his remedy; he
sued in equity when he had an adequate remedy at law). The Moseley case has
not been cited by the Nebraska Supreme Court for almost sixty years.
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ment with no opportunity to amend if the petition is deficient-is both
a harsh approach in light of the uncertainty inherent in code pleading
and a questionable approach in light of the basic purpose of code
pleading: to simplify pleading in order to ensure that cases will be
decided on their merits rather than on technicalities.48 Yet, it is some-
what misleading to refer to this as the "traditional approach."
Although it has been followed for well over 100 years, the substantive
context in which it operates has changed dramatically over the years.
The notion that a case should not be remanded simply to allow the
plaintiff to amend his petition took hold during an age in which res
judicata49 was an extremely narrow doctrine. Unlike the broad trans-
actional analysis that courts utilize today,5O res judicata analysis his-
48. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
49. Under the doctrine of resjudicata, a final judgment on the merits precludes the
subsequent assertion of a second suit based on the same cause of action and be-
tween the same parties as the first. See, e.g., Gaspar v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260, 262-63,
307 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1981). For a relatively concise discussion of resjudicata, see
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MaILER, supra note 12, at 606-58.
50. This approach focuses primarily on whether the successive suits arise out of the
same transaction, ie., the same operative facts. If so, the two suits are based on
the same cause of action. See, e.g., Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15,17 (1st Cir. 1983)
(applying Massachusetts law); Costantini v. TWA, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982); Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 645-46
(Me. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). Although the Ne-
braska Supreme Court employs the same evidence test to determine whether two
suits are both based on the same cause of action, see Vantage Enter. v. Caldwell,
196 Neb. 671, 675-76, 244 N.W.2d 678, 681 (1976), there is often no meaningful
difference between the same evidence test as applied by the court and the same
transaction test. In Vantage, the plaintiff entered into a contract to build a home
for Caldwell. The parties later had a falling out and the plaintiff sued Caldwell to
recover the amount due under the contract. After the jury returned a verdict for
Caldwell, the plaintiff filed a second suit for quantum meruit. The court held
that the second suit was barred by resjudicata because the same evidence would
sustain both suits. Id. at 676, 244 N.W.2d at 681.
The explanation that the court gave for its holding in Vantage is somewhat
misleading. Although there will inevitably be a substantial evidentiary overlap
between a suit for breach of contract and a suit for quantum meruit, the evidence
is not in fact the same. For example, quantum meruit requires proof of the rea-
sonable value of the work done and benefit conferred while breach of contract
simply requires proof of the contract price. Even though the evidence might not
have been the same, the two suits at issue in Vantage did arise out of the same
transaction: the construction of Caldwell's house. In other words, they were
both based on the same cause of action.
This discussion should not be interpreted as suggesting that the law of res
judicata is settled in Nebraska. There are relatively recent cases in which the
court has reverted to the very narrow same right test for determining whether
successive actions are based on the same cause of action. See Suhr v. City of
Scribner, 207 Neb. 24, 295 N.W.2d 302 (1980) (suit for wrongful eviction based on
allegations that defendant city entered into a contract giving plaintiff the right to
operate a landfill dump but that defendant later locked out the plaintiff did not
bar a second suit for breach of the dump contract, apparently because the first
suit was in tort and the second suit in contract).
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torically focused on the question of whether the legal right the
plaintiff sought to enforce in the second action was identical to the
legal right that he sought to enforce in the first action.5 1 An action for
breach of contract, for example, would not bar a second action for
quantum meruit; the first action sought to enforce a right arising out
of an express contract while the second sought to enforce a right aris-
ing out of an implied contract.52
Of more significance from a pleading standpoint, dismissal for fail-
ure to state a cause of action only barred the plaintiff from maintain-
ing a second suit when the petition contained the same allegations as
those contained in the petition dismissed in the previous suit.53 By
contrast, if the court dismissed an action because the plaintiff failed to
include a necessary allegation in his petition, the dismissal was not
deemed to be a final judgment on the merits and therefore did not bar
the plaintiff from filing a subsequent action so long as his second peti-
tion included that missing allegation.54
Viewed in light of its historical underpinnings, the rule that a case
should never be remanded simply to give the plaintiff an opportunity
to amend his pleadings was neither harsh nor insensitive to the uncer-
tainties of code pleading. A plaintiff who elected to stand on his peti-
tion because of a reasonable but mistaken belief that the petition was
legally sufficient was not left without any means of pursuing his claim.
51. See, e.g., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927); Latta v. Visel, 37
Neb. 612, 615-16, 56 N.W. 311, 312 (1893); Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170
N.Y. 40, 45, 62 N.E. 772, 774 (1902); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 16, at 598-
600.
52. See, e.g., Zawada v. Pennsylvania Sys. Bd. of Adj., 392 Pa. 207,213-14,140 A.2d 335,
338, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958); Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 71-72, 111
N.E.2d 209, 212 (1953); Meirick v. Wittemarm Lewis Aircraft Co., 98 N.J. 531, 532,
121 A. 670, 671 (1923). That is no longer true in Nebraska. See supra note 50.
53. See, e.g., W.E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 186 F.2d 236,
237 (2d Cir. 1951); Citizens Mortgage Corp. v. Second Ave. Ltd. Dividend Hous.
Ass'n, 72 Mich. App. 1, 4-5, 248 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Ct. App. 1976); Flynn v. Sinclair
Oil Corp., 20 A.D.2d 636, 636-37, 246 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (1964); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 comments c-e (1942). When the petition in the second
action is essentially identical to the petition in the first action, it is somewhat
inaccurate to say that the second action is barred by resjudicata. It is more accu-
rate to say that the second action is barred by direct estoppel; the question of
whether the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action was already liti-
gated by the same parties in the first action. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 45, comment d (1942).
54. See, e.g., Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal. 2d 826, 828-29, 249 P.2d 264, 265-66 (1952);
Abbott v. Bean, 295 Mass. 268, 274-76, 3 N.E.2d 762, 766-67 (1936); Rost v. Kroke,
195 Minn. 219, 221-22, 262 N.W. 450, 451 (1935); Welsh v. Sarpy County, 87 Neb.
562, 564, 127 N.W. 868, 869 (1910); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 50 &
comments c-e (1942). The current Restatement takes the opposite position: a dis-
missal for failure to state a cause of action is a final judgment on the merits and is
therefore entitled to full res judicata effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 19 & comment d (1982).
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While he would not be permitted to amend his pleading to correct the
defect, he could accomplish the very same purpose by filing a new suit.
In fact, the no-remand rule was apparently based on the assumption
that the limited scope of res judicata ensured that a plaintiff would
not lose the right to litigate his claim because of a mere pleading tech-
nicality. In the earliest reported case specifically discussing the no-
remand rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
We have less hesitation in sustaining the trial court than we should have if
the result would preclude plaintiff from bringing another action in proper
form to establish his rights.... The judgment in this action will not bar an
action... [based on a complaint containing the allegations omitted from the
complaint under review]. It is probable that the complaint could have been
amended and made good... [by including those allegations]; but application to
do so was not made in the court below, and we have no right to reverse the
case and send it back merely for the purpose of permitting such an application
to be made.
5 5
While the resjudicata consequences of standing on a petition were
once virtually nonexistent, that is no longer true today. In 1963, the
Nebraska Supreme Court decided Knapp v. City of Omaha5 6 and held
that dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is a final judgment
on the merits and therefore bars the plaintiff from filing a second suit
in an attempt to plead his cause of action properly. The court based its
decision on the need for finality, emphasizing:
If this court should hold a cause of action stated in a petition as to which a
general demurrer was interposed and sustained and the cause dismissed could
be reasserted in a subsequent action by adding one or more essential aver-
ments not previously pleaded, litigation would have no finality. Finality
would then turn not on what cause had been attempted to be stated but what
by amendment might have been stated. In such cases, the conclusiveness of
decisions would be seriously impaired. A party should not be vexed with suc-
cessive actions on the same cause of action. A judgment of dismissal after
sustaining a demurrer based on the failure to state a cause of action is a judg-
ment on the merits even though by amendments a good cause of action might
be stated.
5 7
It is difficult to quarrel with the court's reasoning-at least in the
abstract. Because a plaintiff will inevitably be given leave to amend if
a demurrer to his petition is sustained, there is no reason to allow him
to file a second suit to accomplish what he could have accomplished in
the first suit. The only plaintiffs who will lose the opportunity to pur-
sue a claim simply because of a pleading technicality are those plain-
tiffs who are so stubborn that they are willing to ignore both their
opportunity to amend and their obligation to plead their cause of ac-
tion properly.
That appears to have been the case in Knapp. Mrs. Knapp filed a
55. Barkey v. Johnson, 90 Minn. 33, 36, 95 N.W. 583, 584 (1903) (emphasis added); see
also Chamberlin v. Hatch, 111 Vt. 317, 323, 15 A.2d 586, 589 (1940).
56. 175 Neb. 576, 122 N.W.2d 513 (1963) [hereinafter Knapp I].
57. Id. at 580-81, 122 N.W.2d at 516.
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negligence suit against the City of Omaha after she slipped off a curb.
Because former section 14-801 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes5s pro-
vided that a city is not liable for damages unless the party gives the
city written notice within ten days after the accident, Mrs. Knapp al-
leged in her petition that she had given the city "proper statutory noti-
fication."5 9 She did not include an allegation, however, specifically
stating the date on which she gave the city that notice.60 After the
trial court sustained the defendant's general demurrer to the petition,
Mrs. Knapp did not seek leave to amend her petition to state the date
on which she gave the city notice. She instead elected to stand on her
petition and appeal. The supreme court affirmed, holding that the
date on which the notice is given is an essential element of the plain-
tiffs cause of action. 61 Mrs. Knapp then filed a new lawsuit against
the city, this time specifically alleging the date she gave the city the
58. Section 14-801 provided in part:
No metropolitan city shall be liable for damages arising from defective
streets, alleys, sidewalks, public parks, or other public places, within
such city unless actual notice in writing, describing fully the accident and
the nature and extent of the injury complained of and describing the
defects causing the injury and stating the time when and with particular-
ity the place where the accident occurred, shall be proved to have been
filed with the city clerk within ten days after the occurrence of such
accident or injury.
NEB, REV. STAT. § 14-801 (1954) (repealed 1969).
59. Knapp v. City of Omaha, 172 Neb. 78, 79, 108 N.W.2d 419, 420 (1961) [hereinafter
Knapp 1].
60. Mrs. Knapp's petition alleged that the accident occurred on July 15, 1957, and
that "after said accident and on the day of July, 1957" the plaintiff
"filed a proper statutory notification which was denied by the City of Omaha
.... " Brief of Appellees at 9-10, Knapp I, 172 Neb. 78, 108 N.W.2d 419 (1961).
Why Mrs. Knapp left that space blank in her petition is a matter of pure conjec-
ture. Perhaps her attorney was careless when he drafted the petition. An
equally plausible explanation, however, is that Mrs. Knapp may not have kept a
copy of the notice and could not remember the precise date on which she gave the
city the required notice. After the court affirmed the judgment in Knapp I on the
ground that Mrs. Knapp's § 14-801 allegation was insufficient, Mrs. Knapp may
have obtained a copy of the notice from the city clerk. NEB. REv. STAT. § 14-801
(1954) (repealed 1969). She did attach a copy of the notice to her petition in
Knapp II. Knapp II, 175 Neb. 576, 578-79, 122 N.W.2d 513, 515 (1963).
61. More specifically, the court said Mrs. Knapp's petition was defective because it
failed to allege that notice was given "within ten days after the occurrence of such
accident or injury." Knapp I, 172 Neb. 78, 80, 108 N.W.2d 419, 420 (1961) (quoting
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-801 (1954) (repealed 1969)). Although that suggests it might
have been sufficient for Mrs. Knapp simply to have tracked the statutory lan-
guage, the court did not explicitly say that such an allegation would have been
proper. An allegation that notice was given "within ten days after the occurrence
of the accident" would arguably be insufficient. It does not provide the court with
the facts necessary to determine whether the notice was actually given within the
required period. In light of the court's penchant for detail, the safer interpreta-
tion of Knapp I is that the plaintiff must plead the specific date on which the
notice was given in order to state a cause of action. See Knapp II, 175 Neb. 576,
580, 122 N.W.2d 573, 516 (1963) (without the date, no cause of action was stated).
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required statutory notice. The trial court ruled that Mrs. Knapp's sec-
ond suit was barred by res judicata, a ruling with which the supreme
court agreed.
6 2
Why Mrs. Knapp elected to stand on her first petition rather than
amending to add a boilerplate allegation that she clearly could have
added almost defies explanation. As the supreme court noted in its
opinion in Knapp II, Mrs. Knapp "would doubtless have been given
the right to amend her petition" had she applied for leave.63 If one
simply read the court's opinions in Knapp I and II, it would be difficult
to avoid the conclusion that Mrs. Knapp was suffering from a case of
foolhardy stubbornness when she elected to stand on her petition.
Those opinions, however, do not tell the full story.
The fact is that Mrs. Knapp had no choice but to appeal the trial
court's ruling in Knapp L The defendants challenged the sufficiency
of Mrs. Knapp's petition on at least seven separate grounds.6 4 There is
currently no way of knowing for certain on which of the grounds the
trial court relied in sustaining the defendant's demurrer. The focus of
the parties' briefs to the supreme court, however, suggests that the
trial court sustained the demurrer, not on the ground that Mrs. Knapp
failed to allege the date on which she gave the city the written notice
required by former section 14-801, but rather on the ground that she
failed to allege compliance with a different statute, former section 14-
802, which required her to give the city notice of the defect in the curb
at least five days before the accident.65 Because Mrs. Knapp evidently
62. Knapp II, 175 Neb. 576, 580-81, 122 N.W.2d 513, 516 (1963).
63. kI at 579-80, 122 N.W.2d at 516.
64. Those seven grounds were: (1) the petition did not allege compliance with § 14-
802; (2) the petition did not properly allege compliance with § 14-801; (3) as a
matter of law, the existence of a sloping curb as alleged in the petition does not
constitute negligence; (4) the petition anticipated but did not negate contributory
negligence; (5) on its face, the petition showed that the condition of the curb was
not the proximate cause of Mrs. Knapp's fall; (6) as a matter of law, the existence
of a slippery curb does not constitute negligence; and (7) the defendants were
absolutely immune because the construction and maintenance of sidewalks is a
governmental function. See Brief of Appellees at 7-22, Knapp I, 172 Neb. 78, 108
N.W.2d 419 (1961).
65. Section 14-802 provided:
Cities of the metropolitan class shall be absolutely exempt from liability
for damages or injuries suffered or sustained by reason of defective pub-
lic ways or the sidewalks thereof, within such cities unless actual notice
in writing describing with particularity the place and nature of the de-
fect shall have been filed with the city clerk at least five days before the
occurrence of such injury or damage.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-802 (1944) (repealed 1969). Both parties' briefs opened with
their respective arguments on the applicability of § 14-802. Brief of Appellant at
4-9, Knapp 1, 172 Neb. 78, 108 N.W.2d 419 (1961); Brief of Appellees at 7-9, Knapp
, 172 Neb. 78, 108 N.W.2d 419 (1961). Although the defendant's brief did include
an argument on the insufficiency of Mrs. Knapp's § 14-801 allegation, see id at 9-
11, Knapp I, Mrs. Knapp's brief did not contain even a passing reference to § 14-
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had not given the city prior notice of any defect in the curb, she could
not have amended her petition to state a cause of action to the satisfac-
tion of the trial court. Appealing under these circumstances was
therefore her only option.
Mrs. Knapp's decision to stand on her original petition and appeal
was not only necessary but also strategically sound. If the supreme
court held that an allegation of prior notice was necessary to state a
cause of action, Mrs. Knapp would have been no worse off than she
would have been had she not appealed. If the supreme court held that
such an allegation was unnecessary-which seemed to be the most
likely result 66-Mrs. Knapp would have been free to pursue her claim
against the city. Of course, there was always the possibility that the
court would hold that an allegation of prior notice was unnecessary
but find Mrs. Knapp's petition defective in another regard, for exam-
ple, because it failed to allege the date on which Mrs. Knapp gave the
city the subsequent notice of the accident.
That seemed to be a remote possibility, however, not only because
the trial court apparently concluded that Mrs. Knapp had properly al-
leged compliance with section 14-801 but also because the supreme
court had never explicitly or implicitly held that a plaintiff must spe-
cifically allege the date on which notice was given in order to state a
cause of action.6 7 Furthermore, even if the court affirmed the dismis-
sal on the ground that such an allegation was necessary, Mrs. Knapp
would not have lost the right to pursue her claim. The unequivocal
rule in Nebraska at the time Mrs. Knapp elected to stand on her peti-
tion was that a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was not a
final judgment for purposes of res judicata. As the court had said on
more than one occasion:
801. It is inconceivable that Mrs. Knapp would have said nothing about the suffi-
ciency of her § 14-801 allegation if the trial court had sustained the demurrer on
the ground that her allegation was insufficient.
66. Mrs. Knapp's petition alleged that the city had been negligent in constructing the
sidewalk, see Brief of Appellant at 4, Knapp I, 172 Neb. 78,108 N.W.2d 419 (1961),
and the court had previously held that prior notice was not required when the
defect was created by the city's own affirmative negligence. See Stewart v. City of
Lincoln, 114 Neb. 96, 98, 206 N.W. 151, 152 (1925); Updike v. City of Omaha, 87
Neb. 228, 234-39, 127 N.W. 229, 231-33 (1910); Tewksbury v. City of Lincoln, 84
Neb. 571, 576, 121 N.W. 994, 996 (1909).
67. The court's prior decisions all involved situations in which the plaintiff made no
attempt whatsoever to plead that the requisite notice had been given. See Harms
v. City of Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 221, 5 N.W.2d 287, 288 (1942); Bethscheider v.
City of Hebron, 137 Neb. 909, 910, 291 N.W. 684, 684 (1940); Chaney v. Village of
Riverton, 104 Neb. 189, 195, 177 N.W. 845, 847 (1920); McCollum v. City of South
Omaha, 84 Neb. 413, 414, 121 N.W. 438, 438 (1909); Schmidt v. City of Fremont, 70
Neb. 577, 578, 97 N.W. 830, 830 (1903); City of Hastings v. Foxworthy, 45 Neb. 676,
679, 63 N.W. 955, 956 (1895). While these cases indicate that the plaintiff must
allege compliance with § 14-801, they do not shed any light on how to make that
crucial allegation.
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If to a petition or pleading in an action a general demurrer is interposed, and
the pleading is determined defective for the want of a material allegation, and
a judgment follows, and in a second suit the material averment which the
pleading in the first suit lacked is supplied, constituting the pleading sufficient
as a statement of a cause of action, the judgment in the first case is not a bar to
the second suit, though both were instituted to obtain the enforcement of the
same right.
6 8
The rest is history. On appeal, the supreme court in Knapp I never
discussed the ground that the trial court relied on to sustain the de-
fendant's demurrer-the failure to allege prior notice pursuant to sec-
tion 14-802-but instead focused exclusively on section 14-801, holding
for the first time that an allegation of "proper statutory notification"
is insufficient to plead that the plaintiff gave the defendant written
notice of the accident within ten days. Despite the fact that its deci-
sion was the first reported opinion to provide plaintiffs with any
meaningful guidance on how to plead compliance with section 14-801,
the court affirmed the judgment against Mrs. Knapp and left her with-
out an opportunity to correct this newly-found defect by amending her
petition. When Mrs. Knapp filed her second suit to correct the defect
in her first petition, the court held for the first time-and without any
mention of its clear precedents to the contrary6 9-that Mrs. Knapp's
68. Welsh v. Sarpy County, 87 Neb. 562, 564, 127 N.W. 868, 869 (1910), quoting State v.
Cornell, 52 Neb. 25, 26, 71 N.W. 961, 961-62 (1897); see Fuchs v. Parsons Constr.
Co., 172 Neb. 719, 721-22, 111 N.W.2d 727, 729 (1961) ("a judgment on a demurrer,
which is based on a technical defect of pleading, a lack of jurisdiction, misjoinder
of parties, or the like, does not involve the merits of the controversy, and is not
available as res judicata."); Trainor v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 92 Neb. 821,
828-29, 139 N.W. 666, 669 (1913) (same); Yates v. Jones Nat'l Bank, 74 Neb. 734,
643, 105 N.W. 287, 290 (1905) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 206 U.S. 158 (1907).
69. The court did attempt to distinguish some of its earlier decisions that had held
that a judgment based on a technical pleading defect does not have res judicata
effect. The court distinguished Fuchs v. Parsons Constr. Co., 172 Neb. 719, 111
N.W.2d 727 (1961) on the ground that Fuchs involved a demurrer sustained for
misjoinder rather than for failure to state a cause of action. Knapp II, 175 Neb.
576, 581, 122 N.W.2d 513, 516-17 (1963). The court also distinguished Trainor v.
Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 92 Neb. 821, 139 N.W. 666 (1913) on the ground that
the failure to allege the date on which notice was given is not a technical defect.
[I]t is obvious that unless that date were supplied no cause of action
whatever was stated. The want of an allegation as to the timely filing of
the notice was fatal. That a petition could be amended without great
difficulty or even with slight effort to state a cause of action does not
make its failure to do so in the first instance a "technical defect." The
defect is so substantial that it defeats the action entirely.
Knapp II, 175 Neb. 576, 580, 122 N.W.2d 513,516 (1963). Although this distinction
has some superficial appeal, it is nevertheless a rather disingenuous distinction.
If the failure to include a slightly more specific allegation of what was already
alleged is not a technical pleading defect, it is difficult to understand what would
be a technical pleading defect. Finally, the court distinguished Yates v. Jones
Nat'l Bank, 74 Neb. 734, 105 N.W. 287 (1905) on the grounds that the second peti-
tion at issue in Yates stated an entirely different cause of action than the first
petition. Knapp I, 175 Neb. 576, 581-82, 122 N.W.2d 513, 517 (1963). Despite the
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suit was barred by res judicata.
To describe what happened to Mrs. Knapp as unfair would be an
understatement. She was deprived of the opportunity to litigate her
claim for no reason other than her inability to foresee developments
that were not reasonably foreseeable. When she drafted her petition,
Mrs. Knapp did not have the benefit of any supreme court decisions
that specifically explained how a plaintiff should plead compliance
with section 14-801. Arguably, Mrs. Knapp should have known that
an allegation of "proper statutory notice" is not an allegation of an
ultimate fact but is instead nothing more than a legal conclusion.
Those three words do not provide the detail necessary to determine
whether the notice was in fact given within the required ten day pe-
riod. But the distinction between an ultimate fact and a conclusion of
law is often elusive, and reasonable minds can differ on the question of
whether a particular allegation falls into one category as opposed to
the other.7
0
It would be a mistake, however, to evaluate the reasonableness of
Mrs. Knapp's belief in the sufficiency of her allegation by simply fo-
court's assertion, that is not what happened in Yates. See Yates v. Jones Nat'l
Bank, 74 Neb. 734, 743, 105 N.W. 287, 290-91 (1905).
Setting aside the question of whether the distinctions the court drew in Knapp
11 are at all persuasive, the fact remains that the court never mentioned its deci-
sions in Welsh or Cornell, most likely because those decisions could not have been
distinguished. Both of them clearly held that resjudicata did not bar a plaintiff
from filing a second suit if the petition contained a crucial allegation that had
been.omitted from the petition in the first action. See supra note 68 and accompa-
nying text.
The court should not do what it did in Knapp. Parties rely on precedent in
analyzing their procedural options and deciding which course of action to follow.
Overturning a decision upon which a party relied is one thing. Applying the new
rule to that same party is another. It smacks of arbitrary and capricious decision-
making. As Justice Caporale bluntly said of the court's recent decision adopting a
new interpretation of the Workmans' Compensation Act and overturning a four
year old opinion in the process:
The only significant thing which has changed since this court's first in-
terpretation of the "arising out of and in the course of" language of the
compensation act is the composition of this court. I respectfully submit
that if the law depends upon nothing more than the predilections of
those who happen to sit on this tribunal at any given time, there is no
law.
Nippert v. Shinn Farm Constr. Co., 223 Neb. 236, 240, 388 N.W.2d 820, 823 (1986)
(Caporale, J., dissenting). When the court reverses a prior decision and adopts a
new rule of procedure, that new rule should be given prospective application. See
Langfeld v. Nebraska Dept. of Roads, 213 Neb. 15, 26, 328 N.W.2d 452, 458 (1982).
In other words, the new rule of resjudicata that the court announced in Knapp 11
should not have been applied to bar Mrs. Knapp's second suit.
70. As the Arizona Supreme Court once said: "The line of separation between a con-
clusion of law and an allegation of ultimate fact is as uncertain as the lines sepa-
rating the cardinal colors in the spectrum." Gill v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 11
Ariz. 232, 239, 95 P. 89, 90 (1908); see supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
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cusing on the abstract distinction between ultimate facts and legal
conclusions. By sustaining the demurrer on the ground that Mrs.
Knapp failed to allege that she gave the city prior notice of the defect
as required by section 14-802, the trial court effectively led Mrs.
Knapp to believe that she had properly alleged compliance with the
subsequent notice requirements of section 14-801. Although in theory
a plaintiff should not assume that an allegation is sufficient merely
because the trial court does not explicitly identify that allegation as
defective, theory does not always mirror reality. The requirements of
code pleading are so unsettled and case-specific that a plaintiff often
has no benchmark against which to evaluate the sufficiency of a peti-
tion other than the trial court's ruling. If the trial court either rejects
or ignores a challenge to a particular allegation, the plaintiff realisti-
cally has no incentive to correct any defects in that allegation by
amending. From the plaintiff's standpoint, there are no defects to
correct.
In short, the Knapp decisions provide a graphic illustration of how
the uncertainties of code pleading, the continuing adherence to the no-
remand rule, the expanding scope of res judicata, and the practice of
affirming on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court have
all combined to create a world of crystal ball litigation, a world in
which cases may turn on the ability of litigants to foresee how the
supreme court will resolve as-of-yet unresolved issues of pleading.
The only way that Mrs. Knapp could have avoided the fate that even-
tually befell her action was if she foresaw not only that the supreme
court would find an allegation defective that the trial court had found
sufficient but also that the supreme court would subsequently reverse
its long-standing position on the resjudicata consequences of a dismis-
sal for failure to state a cause of action.71
71. Had Mrs. Knapp been able to foresee those developments, she would have known
how to proceed. Rather than immediately appealing, she would have filed an
amended petition specifically alleging the date on which she gave the city notice
of the accident, even though she knew that the defendants would demur to the
amended petition and that the demurrer would be sustained because the trial
court had already ruled that the absence of an allegation that she complied with
§ 14-802 rendered her petition fatally defective. Once the trial court sustained
the demurrer to the amended petition, Mrs. Knapp would have appealed that
ruling on the ground that she was not required to allege compliance with § 14-802
in order to state a cause of action.
The course of action suggested here is based on the assumption that the de-
fendants would have filed a demurrer to the second petition rather than a motion
to strike. A motion to strike would have been inappropriate because the
amended petition would have included a material allegation not included in the
original petition. In general, a motion to strike is the proper response to an
amended petition that does not differ in any material respect from the original
petition. If a motion to strike is granted under those circumstances, the plaintiff
cannot argue on appeal that the original petition in fact stated a cause of action.
The plaintiff can only argue that the amended petition includes a material allega-
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Although no litigant is blessed with that degree of clairvoyance,
our procedural system has developed into a system that assumes that
litigants are capable of anticipating and adhering to pleading mandates
that the supreme court has not yet announced. That assumption was
built into the system by Knapp 1I and its holding that a dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action is a final judgment on the merits for
purposes of resjudicata. A plaintiff who elects to stand on his petition
and appeal now runs the risk of being forever barred from litigating
his claim even though the supreme court may not have previously ad-
dressed the pleading requirements for the cause of action at issue.
The inevitable result is that pleading has become an end in itself
rather than a means to an end, with cases being decided solely on the
basis of pleading technicalities.
It is extremely unlikely that the supreme court intended to create
such a harsh and unforgiving procedural system when it decided
Knapp II. What most likely happened is that the court fell into the
common trap of viewing procedural rules as independent rather than
interdependent. Standing alone, each of the court's decisions in the
Knapp litigation is defensible and based on sound policy. The court's
holding in Knapp I- that a plaintiff suing a city for damages caused
by a defective sidewalk must specifically allege that he gave the city
notice within ten days of the accident rather than merely alleging that
he gave the city "proper statutory notification"-may seem rather
hypertechnical. Requiring that level of detail, however, arguably fur-
thers one of the purposes of our pleading system: to eliminate frivo-
lous lawsuits at their inception.72
tion omitted from the original petition. See Clark v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co.,
139 Neb. 65, 70-71, 296 N.W. 449, 452-53 (1941); Wheeler v. Barker, 51 Neb. 846,
850, 71 N.W. 750, 750 (1897).
72. It is often said that pleading serves two basic purposes: first, to provide the de-
fendant with notice sufficient to allow him to prepare his defense and, second, to
identify the issues for trial. E.g., Bashus v. Turner, 218 Neb. 17, 21, 352 N.W.2d
161, 165 (1984); B.C. Christopher & Co. v. Danker, 196 Neb. 518, 522, 244 N.W.2d
79, 81 (1976). Although it is not often explicitly stated, a third purpose of plead-
ing is to eliminate frivolous suits at their inception. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE, & A. MILLER, supra note 12, at 239. Requiring more detail from the
pleader makes it more likely that the system can identify claims upon which the
plaintiff will be unable to prevail as a matter of law, thereby avoiding the expense
and time involved in trying the case.
In many ways, however, these functions have been superseded over time by
other procedural devices. While insisting on a factually detailed statement of the
plaintiff's claim may once have been necessary in order to allow the defendant to
prepare his case, that is no longer true. Nebraska's discovery procedures now
parallel the liberal discovery provisions of the federal rules. See NEB. S. CT. REV.
RuLEs 26-37 (1986). Omitting the details from a petition does not leave the de-
fendant helpless. He can fill in those details through discovery.
Likewise, the availability of the pretrial conference at the district court level
reduces the significance of the petition in terms of defining the issues for trial.
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Likewise, the court's holding in Knapp I!-that dismissal for fail-
ure to state a cause of action is a final judgment-may seem rather
harsh. Adopting that rule, however, furthers the basic policies under-
lying the doctrine of resjudicata-to ensure finality and to protect the
defendant from the harassment of multiple litigation.73 Although in
isolation both of these decisions are defensible and vindicate impor-
tant policies, the result they produce in conjunction with each other is
indefensible; they elevate curable pleading technicalities to the level
of incurable substantive defects.
Each aspect of our procedural system is interrelated. Whether a
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action should be given resjudi-
cata effect is not a question that can be answered by simply focusing
on the need for finality. The rules of res judicata do not operate in a
vacuum. They instead operate within the context of a pleading sys-
tem, and their effect in turn depends on the characteristics of the sys-
tem in which they operate. For example, the consequences of giving
res judicata effect to a dismissal are much different in the fast and
See NEB. S. CT. REv. RULES, supra, at 10.1. Even in the absence of a pretrial
conference, the first petition--and sometimes even the final petition-is unlikely
to set the agenda for trial. New information uncovered through discovery may
lead to the introduction of new issues through an amended petition. Further-
more, the court has significantly relaxed the rules historically governing variance
and has also recognized that pleadings can be amended after trial to conform with
the evidence actually introduced and issues actually tried. See, e.g., Eicher v.
Eicher, 148 Neb. 173, 179, 26 N.W.2d 808, 812 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-842
(1985).
Obsolescence is also beginning to characterize the third function of pleading:
eliminating frivolous lawsuits at their inception. While rigorous pleading re-
quirements may once have been necessary to smoke out frivolous suits before
trial, that is no longer true. In 1951, Nebraska parted company with the original
Field Code and adopted the summary judgment procedure, see 1951 Neb. Laws
199-200 (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1330 to 25-1336 (1985)), a procedure
that is more finely tuned to eliminating frivolous lawsuits than the demurrer pro-
cedure. Unlike a demurrer which essentially focuses on how well the plaintiff
said whatever he said, a motion for summary judgment focuses on whether there
is any factual basis for what the plaintiff said. In other words, it focuses on the
merits of the plaintiff's claim.
Giving notice to the defendant, identifying the issues for trial, and eliminating
utterly frivolous suits are not the only functions that pleading serves. The plead-
ings also indicate whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction and create a
permanent record of what was tried, a record that may become important in de-
termining whether a subsequent suit is barred by resjudicata. See F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 16, at 127-28. When all is said and done, however, the basic
purpose of pleading-especially when analyzed in light of the various changes in
the Nebraska procedural system discussed above--is simply to serve as the open-
ing salvo in the litigation and to give the court a basic understanding of the case.
See C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 57.
73. See, e.g., DeCosta Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Kirkland, 210 Neb. 815, 819, 316 N.W.2d




loose world of federal notice pleading than they are in the uncertain
and intricate world of code pleading.74 Unlike a pleader in federal
courts, a pleader in Nebraska state court cannot ignore the murky dis-
tinction between ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and legal conclu-
sions.75 Unlike a pleader in federal court, a pleader in Nebraska state
court does not have the benefit of reported pleading decisions from
three tiers of courts. The risk that a pleader will find himself without
any meaningful guidance as to how a particular cause of action should
be pled-and the corresponding risk that a case may be decided on the
basis of an unforeseen pleading technicality-is therefore much
greater in the Nebraska state court system than it is in the federal
system.
The court in Knapp H was not insensitive to this risk, but focused
its analysis too narrowly. In holding that a dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action is a final judgment on the merits, the court
noted that Mrs. Knapp would have been allowed to amend her peti-
tion but instead elected to appeal. 76 Apparently, the court concluded
that the liberal amendment provisions of section 25-85477 offset the
harshness of giving resjudicata effect to dismissals for failure to state
a cause of action.78 The opportunity to amend in the first action elimi-
nates any meaningful risk that a mistake in pleading will inevitably
deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate his claim on the
merits.
Although the opportunity to amend is an important protection, it is
not a panacea. Because of the general demurrer and the related doc-
trine that a correct result based on incorrect grounds should neverthe-
less be affirmed, a plaintiff may be barred from litigating his claim
74. In arguing that a dismissal for failure to state a claim should be given full res
judicata effect, Professors Wright and Miller have emphasized the liberality of
federal notice pleading
In older times ... there was ample opportunity to misplead a valid claim;
preclusion would have been a harsh penalty to impose for failure to un-
ravel all the intricacies of pleading....
Pleading has moved so far from older rules that in many courts great
effort would be required to plead a valid claim so ineptly as to suffer
dismissal.
18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4439 (1981). It does not take "great effort" to misplead a valid claim in Ne-
braska state court.
75. Compare Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1982) with New-
man Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178, 182, 302 N.W.2d 297, 700 (1981).
76. See supra text accompanying note 63.
77. The text of § 25-854 is reproduced supra note 42.
78. The relative ease of amending a petition is generally cited as the primary justifi-
cation for giving full res judicata effect to judgments dismissing an action for
failure to state a cause of action. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 19 comment d (1982); C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 530-31; Von Moschzisker, Res
Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 319 (1929).
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because of a pleading technicality that he had no realistic opportunity
to correct by way of amendment.79 The trial court may sustain the
demurrer on one ground, thereby implicitly (or explicitly) leading the
plaintiff to believe that his petition is otherwise sufficient to state a
cause of action. Unless the plaintiff has a good faith basis for making
the allegation that the trial court found lacking, the plaintiff has no
choice but to appeal. On appeal, however, the supreme court may con-
clude that the petition is insufficient, not because of the alleged defect
that the trial court identified but because of a defect that the trial
court never identified. That is precisely the situation in which Mrs.
Knapp found herself. As previously discussed, she could not have re-
alistically amended her petition at the trial court level to cure a defect
that, for all practical purposes, she first became aware of when the
supreme court rendered its decision.SO
The ameliorating effect of section 25-854 is further eroded by the
fact that amending a petition is not a risk-free proposition. By filing
an amended petition, a plaintiff waives any objection that the trial
court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the o-iginal petition.81
While waiving that objection may not be of any practical significance
79. The doctrine that a correct result based on incorrect grounds should nevertheless
be affirmed is explored in further detail in the text accompanying notes 133-50
infra.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
81. See Raskey v. Michelin Tire Corp., 223 Neb. 520, 524-25, 391 N.W.2d 123, 126-27
(1986); Hoffman v. Geiger, 134 Neb. 643, 648, 279 N.W. 350, 353 (1938); Wheeler v.
Barker, 51 Neb. 846, 849, 71 N.W. 750, 750 (1897). Although the federal courts
have traditionally applied the waiver rule, see, e.g., Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57
(9th Cir. 1967), the rule has not only come under strong attack recently but has
also been rejected by a number of courts. See Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp.,
566 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 444 U.S. 959 (1979); Blazer v. Black,
196 F.2d 139, 143 (10th Cir. 1952).
Requiring a plaintiff to forego the opportunity to amend a petition in order to
preserve his right to challenge the sustaining of a demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action, while at the same time allowing a defendant to answer without
forgoing his right to challenge the overruling of a demurrer, see supra note 41, is
at best logically inconsistent. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (1971). More importantly, the waiver rule is unjust. As-
sume, for example, that the plaintiff asserts two counts in his petition, both of
which are based on the same cause of action. The trial court erroneously sustains
a demurrer to the plaintiff's first count on a substantive ground and correctly
sustains a demurrer to the plaintiff's second count on a pleading ground. By
amending, the plaintiff forgoes the right to proceed on the first count even
though it is a valid claim under the law. The amended petition may correct a
defect in the second count but the allegations in the first count will remain the
same. Those allegations are therefore vulnerable to a motion to strike. See supra
note 71. By appealing, the plaintiff forgoes the right to proceed on the second
count even though the claim could be properly pleaded with the addition of one
or more boilerplate allegations. The first count may be valid but the court will
affirm the judgment without leave to amend in so far as the second count is con-
cerned. This Hobson's choice approach to litigation is intolerable and unjustifi-
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in some cases, it can be of crucial significance in others. For example,
assume that the plaintiff's petition properly pleads elements a, b, and c
and that the trial court subsequently sustains a demurrer on the
ground that the plaintiff must also allege element d in order to state a
cause of action.8 2 Rather than standing on his petition and appealing,
the plaintiff elects to amend his petition to add element d. Although
the plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence at trial on elements a, b,
and c, judgment is nevertheless entered against him because he failed
to introduce sufficient evidence on element d.
The plaintiff cannot appeal that judgment on the ground that d is
not an element of his cause of action-irrespective of whether the trial
court's ruling in that regard was correct. By amending his petition to
add element d, the plaintiff acquiesced in the trial court's ruling and
consequently waived his right to argue that element d is not an essen-
tial element of his cause of action.8 3 In other words, the plaintiff vol-
untarily submitted his case to the trier of fact under the theory that
element d was essential. So long as the trial court was correct in find-
ing the plaintiff's evidence on element d insufficient, the judgment
will be affirmed on appeal even though the supreme court may con-
clude that the trial court was incorrect in holding that element d was
essential. Cases are reviewed in light of the theory on which they
were submitted to the trier of fact-even though that theory may be
incorrect as a matter of law.
8 4
By way of summary, the choice between appealing and amending is
not necessarily an easy one to make or one that is always available.
Setting aside the difficulty of evaluating with any degree of certainty
whether a petition is sufficient to state a cause of action, the decision
of whether to appeal or to amend is complicated by the rules of appel-
late review and waiver. To believe that amendment provisions of sec-
tion 25-854 adequately ensure that our pleading requirements do not
operate as a trap for the diligent would be to ignore the complex reali-
ties of our procedural system.
able. The waiver rule should therefore be relegated to the scrap heap of
antiquated procedure.
82. The example assumes that the supreme court has not specifically addressed the
issue of whether element d is an element of the plaintiff's cause of action.
83. See Fishel v. Givens, 47 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517, 362 N.E.2d 97, 101 (Ct. App. 1977);
Harmon v. James, 146 Kan. 205, 208, 69 P.2d 690, 692 (1937); Raskey v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 223 Neb. 520, 525, 391 N.W.2d 123, 126-27 (1986).
84. See, e.g., Rieschick Drilling Co. v. American Casualty Co., 208 Neb. 142, 150, 303
N.W.2d 264, 269 (1981); Bohmont v. Moore, 141 Neb. 91, 94, 2 N.W.2d 599, 601
(1942); U.S. Tire Dealers Mut. Corp., 139 Neb. 26, 28, 296 N.W. 333, 335 (1941);
Behle v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 138 Neb. 566, 568, 293 N.W. 413, 415 (1940);
Parker v. Knights Templars & Masons Life Indemnity Co., 70 Neb. 268, 277, 97
N.W. 281, 284 (1903).
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B. The Advantages of Modifying the No-Remand Rule
All of this should not be taken to mean that the court should aban-
don its holding in Knapp I and return to the rule that a dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action has no res judicata effect. The prob-
lem that Knapp I creates is sufficiently narrow to warrant a narrow
solution. The requirements for pleading a number of causes of action
are fairly well-settled. In those situations, it is neither unfair nor un-
realistic to expect a plaintiff to plead his cause of action properly.
There is always the possibility that the plaintiff may inadvertently
omit an essential element or fail to allege an element in sufficient de-
tail, but those are the kinds of mistakes that can be corrected by
amendment after demurrer.
The problem is that not all pleading requirements are well settled.
To expect a plaintiff to plead his cause properly without the benefit of
any meaningful guidance from the supreme court or the legislature is
both unfair and unrealistic. There is no justification for penalizing a
plaintiff merely because his was the first case in which the supreme
court addressed the requirements for pleading one or more of the ele-
ments of a particular cause of action. It accomplishes nothing-except
perhaps to rid the courts of a potentially meritorious action.8 5
Eliminating this penalty does not require abandoning the doctrine
of res judicata, abolishing the general demurrer, or doing away with
code pleading. The competing policies served by res judicata--ensur-
ing finality-and by code pleading-ensuring that cases are decided on
their merits rather than on pleading technicalities-can both be vindi-
cated within the context of our current procedural system by modify-
ing the no-remand rule to reflect the changes that have occurred in
the doctrine of resjudicata since the inception of the no-remand rule.
When the court concludes that the demurrer under review should
have been sustained, it should not automatically affirm the judgment.
It should instead analyze whether the pleading requirement that the
plaintiff failed to meet is one that the plaintiff could have reasonably
foreseen. In other words, the court should determine whether the re-
quirement has been meaningfully discussed in the court's prior deci-
sions or is, in effect, a new pleading requirement. If it is a new
requirement, the court should reverse and remand with instructions
85. Even assuming arguendo that disposing of both the wheat and the chaff somehow
makes our procedural system more efficient, that efficiency is achieved at high
cost, including perhaps an erosion of public confidence in the judiciary. It must
be very difficult for a layman to understand why the failure to include some legal
mumbo jumbo in a piece of paper should irrevocably deprive him of his day in
court, especially when no one had any reason to believe that those magic words
belonged in the petition. "Strict pleading produces a reaction, because people will




that the plaintiff be given leave to amend his petition. Knapp I, for
example, would have been a prime candidate for remand rather than
affirmance. Although the court's prior decisions clearly indicated that
a plaintiff must plead compliance with section 14-801, those decisions
did not indicate the kind of allegation that would be sufficient.86 That
came for the first time in Knapp L The court's opinion therefore an-
nounced what was effectively a new rule of pleading.
A more recent-and more compelling-example of a case in which
remanding rather than affirming would have been appropriate is Mor-
ris v. Lutheran Medical Center.8 7 Prior to its decision in that case, the
court had never specifically recognized the cause of action that Mrs.
Morris was attempting to state: a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge based on the provisions of an employee handbook.88 Mrs. Mor-
86. See supra note 67.
87. 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983).
88. The court had previously addressed the issue in Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207
Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980). The plaintiff in Mau argued that the bank's
employee handbook constituted an employment contract that limited the bank's
right to discharge the plaintiff at will. The court disagreed. After emphasizing
that the handbook specifically said, "THIS BOOKLET IS NOT A CONTRACT,"
the court went on to add:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that the publications relied upon constituted
part of an employment contract, in the absence of a promise on the part
of the employer that the employment should continue for a period of
time that is definite or capable of determination, such employment rela-
tionship would still be terminable at the will of the employer as it consti-
tutes an indefinite general hiring.
Id. at 314-15, 299 N.W.2d at 151. The court's decision in Mau is susceptible to two
possible interpretations: first, the terms of an employee handbook do not limit an
employer's right to discharge an employee who was hired for an indefinite period
of time; and, second, the terms of an employee handbook may limit an employer's
right to discharge an employee unless the employer specifically states that the
handbook creates no contractual obligations. The court in Morris subsequently
chose the second interpretation. Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb.
677, 680, 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1963).
The law of wrongful discharge is currently anything but settled in Nebraska.
Although other states have recognized a public policy exception to the at-will
doctrine, see, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 418, 390 A.2d 149, 150
(Law Div. 1978), the Nebraska Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether it
will recognize that exception. See Mueller v. Union Pac. R.R., 220 Neb. 742, 751-
52, 371 N.W.2d 732, 737-38 (1985). In 1985, the Legislature passed L.B. 324 which,
inter alia, prohibits an employer from discharging an employee in retaliation for
the employee's refusal to engage in unlawful activity. 1985 Neb. Laws 624-25
(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102 (Cum. Supps. 1985 & 1986)). The precise
scope of L.B. 324 is unclear and the legislation leaves a number of questions unan-
swered. See Loudon, L.B. 324: Codification of the Public Policy Exception to the
Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Nebraska, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 599 (1986).
While a number of other states have also invoked the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to limit an employer's right of discharge still further,
see, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,455, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980), the Nebraska Supreme Court has to date resisted any
attempts to invoke the implied covenant in the employment context. See Jeffers
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ris was therefore blazing a new trail, in terms of both substance and
pleading. She successfully blazed the first trail, and, despite the ab-
sence of any Nebraska decisions analyzing how to plead such a cause
of action, came close to blazing the second trail successfully. But close
was not good enough.
Mrs. Morris worked as a nurse at the Lutheran Medical Center in
Omaha from 1978 until she was fired in 1981. Pursuant to the griev-
ance procedures contained in the Medical Center's employee hand-
book, Mrs. Morris appealed her firing to the hospital's employee
grievance committee. The committee subsequently recommended
that Mrs. Morris be reinstated.8 9 Although that recommendation was
not automatically binding on the hospital, the grievance procedure
specifically provided that the hospital's president must follow the
committee's recommendation unless he concluded that the recom-
mendation conflicted "with established hospital policy or applicable
laws and regulations." 90 The president reversed the committee's deci-
sion, however, apparently because he believed that the decision was
not supported by the facts.91
Mrs. Morris then filed suit against the hospital, alleging that the
grievance procedures were part of her employment contract with the
hospital and that the hospital's president breached that contract by
failing to follow the committee's recommendation.9 2 The trial court
eventually dismissed the action on the ground that an employee who,
like Mrs. Morris, does not have an employment contract for a definite
period of time can be discharged for any reason whatsoever.93 On ap-
peal, the supreme court held that the grievance procedures in an em-
ployee handbook can become part of an oral employment contract
even though the contract is indefinite as to time. The court neverthe-
less affirmed the dismissal because Mrs. Morris failed to allege specifi-
cally that the grievance committee's findings did "not conflict with
established hospital policy or applicable laws and regulations." 9 '
The court's decision must have come as something of a surprise to
the parties. Mrs. Morris had structured her appeal on the reasonable
v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 222 Neb. 829, 833, 387 N.W.2d 692, 695 (1986).
For a general discussion of the ever-receding contours of the at-will doctrine, see
Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assess.
ment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1 (1984).
89. Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 678, 340 N.W.2d 388, 390 (1963).
90. Id. at 679, 340 N.W.2d at 391.
91. See Appellant's Opening Brief at app. 2, Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215
Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983).
92. Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 678, 340 N.W.2d 388, 390 (1963).
93. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Peter C. Bataillon (Aug. 14,1986)
(on file in Rm. 213 of Univ. Neb. Law College) [hereinafter Bataillon Memo]. Mr.
Bataillon represented Mrs. Morris in the litigation.
94. Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 681, 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1963).
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assumption that the only issue was whether the indefinite term of her
employment contract established as a matter of law that the parties
did not intend the grievance procedures to be binding. The sufficiency
of Mrs. Morris' allegation that the hospital's president violated the
grievance procedures was never questioned by either the defendant or
the trial court.9 5 In fact, it was not even questioned by any of the Jus-
tices during oral argument.96
Mrs. Morris' case was therefore one in which remanding rather
than affirming would clearly have been appropriate. It was a case of
first impression and one in which no one could have reasonably fore-
seen either the issue that the court ultimately found dispositive or the
level of specificity that the court ultimately demanded. Although
Mrs. Morris failed specifically to allege that the committee's findings
did "not conflict with established hospital policy or applicable laws
and regulations," 97 she did allege the substantial equivalent. Her peti-
tion alleged:
That the President of Defendant hospital, contrary to the rules and proce-
dures of the employee grievance procedure and, in particular, step 4 of the
employee grievance procedure, ignored the committee's findings and recom-
mendations and reversed the committee's findings and upheld the action pre-
viously taken of termination.
9 8
Mrs. Morris' petition also incorporated the grievance provisions by ref-
erence. Step 4 provided: "So long as the committee's recommendation
does not conflict with established hospital policy or applicable laws
and regulations, the President shall not substitute his judgment for
that of the committee." 99
Taken together, these two allegations amount to an allegation, or
at the very least a suggestion, that the committee's recommendation
did not conflict with established policy or applicable laws and regula-
tions.100 In retrospect, that was not enough. Like Mrs. Knapp twenty
years earlier, Mrs. Morris lost her case simply because she failed to
comply with a pleading requirement that she could not have reason-
ably anticipated.101
95. Bataillon Memo, supra note 93, at 1.
96. Motion for Rehearing at 2, Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340
N.W.2d 388 (1983).
97. Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 681, 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1963).
98. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 96, at 4 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. If step 4 required the president to follow a committee recommendation that does
not conflict with established hospital policy or applicable laws and regulations,
and if the president acted contrary to step 4 in reversing the committee's recom-
mendation, then it would seem to follow logically that the committee's recom-
mendation did not conflict with established hospital policy or applicable laws and
regulations.
101. Although Mrs. Morris lost the battle, she did not lose the war. After the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, Mrs. Morris filed a second suit against
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Modifying the no-remand rule to allow for remand in cases of first
impression like Morris is not without precedent from other jurisdic-
tions. In Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.,102 for example, the plaintiffs
filed a strict liability action against Parke Davis in Illinois state court,
alleging that Parke Davis failed to warn patients and physicians of the
danger of using a drug that the company manufactured. The trial
court granted Parke Davis' motion to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiffs failed to allege that Parke Davis knew of the danger. On
the hospital, this time including a more specific allegation on the committee's
findings. Mrs. Morris argued that her second suit was not barred by resjudicata
because the trial judge in Morris I did not specify whether the dismissal was with
or without prejudice. Therefore, the dismissal should be deemed without preju-
dice. The trial judge in Morris Iaccepted that argument and allowed the action
to go forward. Shortly thereafter, the parties settled the case. Bataillon Memo,
supra note 93, at 1-2.
The trial judge in Morris H was wrong when he allowed the action to go for-
ward. Although there are no Nebraska cases or statutes addressing the effect of
dismissal that fails to specify whether it is with or without prejudice, such a dis-
missal should be deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. Cf Akins v. Chamber-
lain, 164 Neb. 428, 431-32, 82 N.W.2d 632, 634 (1957) (although the Court upheld
the power of a trial court to dismiss without prejudice when the petition fails to
state a cause of action, the judgment of dismissal under review specifically stated
that the dismissal was without prejudice). Prior to Knapp II, a dismissal for fail-
ure to state a cause of action only barred the plaintiff from instituting a second
suit based on the same allegations as the first. See supra notes 53-54, 68 and ac-
companying text. In other words, resjudicata was the exception rather than the
general rule.
The court shifted that presumption, however, when it decided Knapp 11 and
held-without any discussion of whether the dismissal at issue in Knapp I was
with or without prejudice-that a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is
a final judgment for purposes of resjudicata. See supra notes 56-57 and accompa-
nying text. To hold that a dismissal is with prejudice--and is therefore entitled to
full resjudicata effect-only if the trial court specifically states that the dismissal
is prejudice would make resjudicata the exception rather than the general rule.
Cf. Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1971) (because the burden ought
to be on the plaintiff to persuade the trial court that res judicata consequences
ought not attach to the dismissal, a dismissal for failure to state a claim is with
prejudice unless the trial court specifically states otherwise). That would in turn
undermine the interests in finality that the court sought to vindicate through its
holding in Knapp II. See supra text accompanying note 57.
Merely because Mrs. Morris was eventually able to obtain some relief does not
mean that the remand proposal outlined in the text is unnecessary. Not every
litigant will be lucky enough to have a trial judge in the second suit who errone-
ously construes the dismissal in the first suit. Furthermore, not every litigant
will be lucky enough to receive a ruling from the supreme court before the stat-
ute of limitations runs. Cf. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Ken-
neth Wade, Clerk of the Nebraska Supreme Court (Sept. 2, 1986) (on file in Rm.
213 of Univ. Neb. Law College) (time from when the appeal is filed until the
opinion is filed is currently running about 16 to 19 months in nonadvanced civil
appeals). Irrespective of whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, the
plaintiff cannot institute a second action after the limitations period has expired.
102. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
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appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held for the first time that knowl-
edge is an essential element that must be pled in a failure to warn case
and that the plaintiffs' complaint therefore failed to state a cause of
action.1 03 Rather than simply affirming the judgment, however, the
court remanded the case with instructions that the plaintiffs be given
leave to amend. As the court explained: "Since we are enunciating
the requirement that knowledge must be alleged in a complaint for
the first time in this opinion, substantial justice would seem to require
that the plaintiffs be given an opportunity to amend their complaint to
comply with this decision.'
04
The Massachusetts Supreme Court took the same approach in Che-
ney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp.1 05 There, the plaintiff filed suit to
recover incentive bonuses that his former employer had refused to
pay. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had quit his job in
order to form a competing corporation. The plaintiff's contract with
the defendant, however, specifically provided that he would forfeit
any unpaid bonuses if he went to work for a competitor. 106 The trial
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action.
On appeal, the supreme court agreed that the plaintiff's complaint
failed to allege a cause of action but nevertheless reversed the judg-
ment. Although the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege any facts that
suggested the forfeiture provision was unreasonable, the court empha-
sized that its decision was the first Massachusetts Supreme Court deci-
sion to delineate the factors relevant to the determination of whether
such a provision was unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.107
That in turn made it inappropriate simply to affirm the judgment.
"[P]articularly because of our indication for the first time of the rele-
vant considerations concerning the enforcement of a forfeiture for
competition clause, we believe that the plaintiff should be given an
103. In holding that knowledge was an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of
action, the Illinois Supreme Court was not writing on a clean slate. There were
conflicting decisions from other states as well as from the Illinois Courts of Ap-
peal. See icL at 31-33, 402 N.E.2d at 196-98. What made the issue one of first im-
pression was that it had never been specifically addressed by the final arbiter of
Illinois law: the Illinois Supreme Court. See i&i at 38, 402 N.E.2d at 200.
104. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 38, 402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (1980).
105. 377 Mass. 141, 385 N.E.2d 961 (1979).
106. Id. at 143-44, 385 N.E.2d at 963.
107. Although there were two Massachusetts decisions that had upheld forfeiture pro-
visions, neither of those decisions had analyzed the enforceability of such a provi-
sion in light of the reasonableness of the resulting restraint imposed on an
employee's ability to seek other employment. Id. at 145, 385 N.E.2d at 964. As in
Woodill, there were conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions, but, as in
Woodill, the crucial consideration from the standpoint of the supreme court was
that it had never specifically addressed the issues under review. See id. at 145-50,
385 N.E.2d at 964-66.
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opportunity to amend his complaint."' 0 8
Other state courts, including those of 1Mfissouri,lo 9Washington,lO
and Wisconsin,"I have also recognized the need for remand in plead-
ing cases of first impression.112 All of these decisions implicitly recog-
nize that parties rely on judicial precedent in drafting their pleadings
and structuring their litigation strategies.113 Although there are gen-
eral principles that govern pleading-for example, a plaintiff must al-
108. I- at 150, 385 N.E.2d at 966.
109. See Bell v. Green, 423 S.W.2d 724, 734-35 (Mo. 1968) (interests of justice require
remanding with leave to amend because plaintiff's erroneous theory of the case
was based on a decision that had not been previously overruled or disapproved by
the Missouri Supreme Court).
110. See Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 202,217,600 P.2d
1034, 1034 (Ct. App. 1979) (in reversing summary judgment for the defendants
and remanding the case, the court explained that "because we here adopt for the
first time the rule of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A, we believe all
plaintiffs should be given an opportunity in the trial court to bring themselves
within the rule.").
111. See Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 120-21, 102 N.W.2d 251, 258-59 (1960) (inter-
ests of justice require remanding with leave to amend because the case was the
first Wisconsin decision to analyze the nature of a dog owner's liability in light of
the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute).
112. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that remand with leave to
amend is the appropriate way to dispose of pleading cases of first impression. See
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
The plaintiff in Linn was a manager at Pinkerton's who filed a libel action
against Local 114, alleging that the local had circulated defamatory leaflets dur-
ing its campaign to organize Pinkerton's. The trial court dismissed the action on
the ground that the libel arguably constituted an unfair labor practice which in
turn meant that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction of
the dispute. Id at 55; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b), 160 (1983). The Supreme Court
disagreed. After concluding that the National Labor Relations Act did not com-
pletely preempt state libel law, the Court went on to hold that libelous state-
ments made during a union organizing campaign were actionable so long as the
statements were made "with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard
of whether they were true or false." Id at 65.
Because Linn represented the first case in which the Court had both ad-
dressed the issue of whether such a claim could be brought in federal court and
discussed the elements that a plaintiff must plead, it was not surprising that
Linn's complaint failed to include all of the allegations necessary to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. That failure did not deprive Linn of his day
in court, however. Rather than simply affirming the dismissal, the Court instead
reversed and remanded the case with instructions that Linn be given leave to
amend his complaint to comply with the Court's newly announced pleading re-
quirements. Id at 66.
113. It must be emphasized that whether a particular pleading issue may have been
discussed in cases from other jurisdictions is irrelevant. Merely because another
state may have adopted a particular rule does not mean that the Nebraska
Supreme Court will inevitably adopt that same rule. See, e.g., Berglund v. Sisler,
210 Neb. 258, 261, 313 N.W.2d 679, 682 (1981). The focus must therefore be on the
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the state in which the action is pend-
ing. See supra notes 103 and 107.
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lege facts sufficient to state a cause of action11 4 -- those vague
principles only become meaningful in the light of judicial opinions.
Those opinions are what define the elements of a cause of action, dis-
cuss how those elements should be alleged, and analyze how detailed
those allegations should be.115 Without that kind of guidance, plead-
ing-and more specifically, code pleading-essentially becomes a roll
of the dice.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has also recognized the crucial role
that judicial precedents play in litigation, though in a slightly different
context. In Langfeld v. Nebraska Department of Roads,116 the court
overruled its earlier decisions and held that a property owner in a con-
demonation case is not competent to testify as to the value of the land
simply by virtue of the fact that he is the owner. 117 The court was
careful to add that this newly announced rule should not be applied
retroactively. "Since the adoption of this rule may make necessary a
different procedural method from that heretofore allowed, it shall ap-
ply only to trials held after the issuance of the mandate in this
case."118 In other words, the court recognized that it would be unfair
to penalize litigants for relying on clearly established precedent.
Admittedly, Langfeld involved the much more dramatic situation
of a court overruling a prior decision rather than of a court announc-
ing a requirement that its previous decisions had not addressed. From
a practical standpoint, however, there is no difference between rowing
toward a mirage and being left adrift in uncharted waters. In both
situations, the parties fail to comply with the correct legal standard,
not because of carelessness, incompetence, or stubbornness, but be-
cause of a lack of clairvoyance.
Like any proposal, the proposal to modify the no-remand rule in
Nebraska has its share of advantages and disadvantages. The chief ad-
vantage of allowing remand in pleading cases of first impression is
that it would help restore pleading to its proper role in our procedural
system. Pleading is not an end in itself.119 It is instead a means of
providing the court with a basic understanding of the case, and, of
lesser importance, a means of giving the defendant notice of the basis
of the claim so that he can begin to prepare his defense. Pleading also
furthers the objectives of eliminating frivolous suits at their inception,
vesting the court with subject matter jurisdiction, and creating a per-
manent record of the case for purposes of trial, resjudicata, collateral
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
116. 213 Neb. 15, 328 N.W.2d 452 (1983).
117. IML at 24-26, 328 N.W.2d at 457-58.
118. Id. at 26, 328 N.W.2d at 458. The court reversed the judgment on other grounds
which therefore meant that the newly announced rule would apply in the second
round of the Langfeld litigation. Id.
119. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 12, at 54.
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estoppel, and execution.120 None of these purposes would be compro-
mised by remanding a case to allow the plaintiff to amend his plead-
ings to conform with a newly articulated pleading requirement. In
fact, denying the plaintiff that opportunity contributes to the very
problem code pleading was designed to combat: disposing of cases on
the basis of form rather than substance.121
The chief disadvantage of modifying the no-remand rule is that it
might encourage plaintiffs to appeal rather than to amend when a de-
murrer is sustained. That would not only increase the supreme court's
workload but might also transform the court into the equivalent of an
"educational sounding board."122 Because cases would be remanded
even though the petition under review fails to state a cause of action,
pleading disputes might well spawn a never-ending parade of risk-free
interlocutory appeals.123
The possibility of that occurring, however, is rather remote. The
proposed modification would call not for remand in every case but
only in those cases in which the Court adopts a pleading standard that
the plaintiff could not have reasonably foreseen. A plaintiff who fails
to allege the absence of probable cause in a suit for malicious prosecu-
tion would be hard-pressed to argue that the judgment should be re-
versed and the case remanded in order to allow him to amend his
petition. The court has unequivocally held that the absence of prob-
able cause is an essential element of malicious prosecution and has
provided clear guidance on how to plead that element.124
120. See supra note 73.
121. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
122. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771, 772 (10th Cir. 1968)
(to allow amendments as a matter of right after appeal would encourage frivolous
appeals).
123. At least one federal court has expressed a concern that allowing a plaintiff to
amend his complaint after unsuccessfully appealing a dismissal for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted "would in effect allow interlocutory
appeals." Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 581 F.2d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
1978); see 3 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTCE S 15.11 (2d ed. 1985). That
should not be taken to mean that a federal court will never remand a case for the
sole purpose of allowing a plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim. See,
e.g., Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 471 (2d Cir. 1978) (court will remand with
leave to amend when "justice so requires"). The Supreme Court has remanded
with leave to amend in order to give a plaintiff the opportunity to comply with
newly announced pleading requirements, and the courts of appeal have often re-
manded cases when the trial court correctly dismissed a complaint but for the
wrong reason. See, e.g., Griffin v. Locke, 286 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1961); Oil, Chem &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Delta Refining Co., 277 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1960);
Marranzano v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
124. A general allegation that the prior action was instituted without probable cause is
sufficient. See Clark v. Folkers, 1 Neb. (unof.) 96, 97, 95 N.W. 328, 328 (1901);
Jones v. Fruin, 26 Neb. 76, 80, 42 N.W. 283, 284 (1889); 7 W. MooRE, NEBRAsKA
PRACTICE § 5941 (1967).
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That is not to say that the absence of a supreme court opinion di-
rectly on point would inevitably require remand with leave to amend.
Again, the proposal only calls for remand when the pleader failed to
comply with a requirement that he could not have reasonably fore-
seen. For example, in Guaranteed Foods of Nebraska, Inc. v. Rison,
5
the court held for the first time that unconscionability is an affirma-
tive defense that must be pled.126 That holding was by no means un-
foreseeable. Although unconscionability is not a concept susceptible
to a pat definition, claims of unconscionability generally fall into one
of two categories: first, that the party was the victim of unfair surprise
and had no meaningful choice but to accept the clause in question, a
claim closely analogous to a claim of fraud or duress; and, second, that
the clause is so one-sided as to make its enforcement unfair and unrea-
sonable, a claim closely analogous to a claim of illegality. 2 7 In other
words, a claim of unconscionability is essentially an admission that the
party entered into the contract but that the contract is nevertheless
unenforceable, either because of unfair surprise or because of public
policy. Unconscionability is therefore nothing more than a variation
on the basic themes of fraud, duress, and illegality-all of which have
long been classified as affirmative defenses.
12 8
While some pleading requirements can be anticipated through rea-
soning by analogy, others cannot be. When a pleader is attempting to
state a cause of action that the court has not yet specifically recog-
nized, there will often be nothing to guide the pleader other than the
vague principle that he should plead facts sufficient to state a cause of
action. To remand those kind of cases will not open the floodgates to a
125. 207 Neb. 400, 299 N.W.2d 507 (1980).
126. Id at 407, 299 N.W.2d at 512. The doctrine of unconscionability is rooted in § 2-
302 of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
NEB. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1980). As the court said in Guaranteed Foods, "there is a
dearth of authority" on the question of whether unconscionability is an affirma-
tive defense. Guaranteed Foods of Nebr., Inc. v. Rison, 207 Neb. 400, 407, 299
N.W.2d 507,512 (1980). Although two cases indicated that unconscionability must
be specifically pleaded, see Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d
775, 776 (D.C. 1971); Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111, 114
(D.C. 1971), the leading treatise in the area took the opposite position. J. W=rTE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
150 (2d ed. 1980).
127. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMhERS, supra note 126, at 147-52.
128. E.g., First Data Resources, Inc. v. Omaha Steaks Int'l Inc., 209 Neb. 327, 331-33,
307 N.W.2d 790, 792-93 (1981) (duress); Fetzer & Co. v. Johnson & Nelson, 93 Neb.
763, 764, 141 N.W. 823, 823 (1913) (fraud); Atchison & Neb. R.R. Co. v. Miller, 16
Neb. 661, 665, 21 N.W. 451, 453 (1884) (illegality).
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raft of pleading appeals. Those are the kind of cases that will probably
be appealed in any event.1 29 It is therefore unlikely that the court
would significantly increase its workload by recognizing that the inter-
ests of justice sometimes require remanding rather than affirming.
In the final analysis, however, whether the proposed remand stan-
dard would increase the court's workload is irrelevant. The basic
question is whether continuing adherence to the no-remand rule
would be consistent with the objective of our procedural system: to
ensure that cases are decided on their merits.
"[R]ules of procedure.., tend to become formalized and rigid and
need to be checked regularly with their objectives and in the light of
their present accomplishment." 3 0 The court's approach to pleading
appeals is no different today than it was 30 years ago-the judgment
will be affirmed if the petition fails to state a cause of action. But
something has changed; thirty years ago, claims were not lost merely
because the plaintiff failed to foresee the level of detail that the court
129. While giving resjudicata effect to dismissals for failure to state a cause of action
may promote finality, it may also retard the development of clear pleading guide-
lines. Because discretion is often the better part of valor, litigants will appeal an
adverse pleading decision only if they have no other choice. The stakes are too
high to do otherwise. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47. It is therefore
not surprising that fewer pleading opinions are being handed down today than
before Knapp If.
That in turn means that litigants and trial courts alike may often have very
little to go on in evaluating the sufficiency of a particular petition, a state of af-
fairs that not only encourages defendants to file demurrers as a matter of course
but may also lead to inconsistent decisions at the trial court level. The system's
overall efficiency inevitably suffers as a result. Recognizing the possibility of re-
manding with leave to amend would counteract that inefficiency. Even assuming
that the prospect of remand might increase the number of pleading appeals over
the short run, that increase would improve the system's efficiency over the long
run. The requirements for pleading a particular cause of action-especially
causes in evolving areas of the law-would be delineated more quickly. In other
words, the trial courts would not be left in the dark for years on end.
Furthermore, the flexibility that the proposed remand standard offers would
eliminate any need for the court to adopt pleading requirements less stringent
than it would otherwise prefer in an attempt to avoid a harsh result. For exam-
ple, the court's most recent pleading decision in the wrongful discharge area sug-
gests that less specificity may be required than its earlier decision in Morris
suggests. Compare Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d
388 (1983) (failure to include allegations sufficiently specific to establish that
compliance with grievance procedures would result in reinstatement was fatal)
with Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp. 222 Neb. 829, 287 N.W.2d 692
(1986) (failure to include allegations that compliance with grievance procedures
could result in reinstatement or like remedy apparently was not fatal; although
failure was raised by the defendant, it was not discussed by the court). Perhaps
the result in Jeffers was both the proper and just result, but the opinion, when
read in light of Morris, does leave pleaders and trial courts somewhat in the dark
as to what must be pled and at what level of detail.
130. Clark, supra note 21, at 460 (footnote omitted).
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ultimately demanded in a petition.'sl Unless our objective is to dis-
pose of claims on the basis of pleading technicalities, our rules of pro-
cedure must be adjusted to take into account the effect of Knapp 11
and its holding that a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is a
final judgment on the merits. At the very least, that adjustment
should include remanding with leave to amend when announcing
what are effectively new requirements for pleading a particular cause
of action.
C. The Unfairness of Affirming on Grounds Other Than Those Relied on
by the Trial Court
Although modifying the no-remand rule in pleading cases of first
impression is a reform long overdue, there is one further step that
should be taken to help ensure that pleading no longer functions as an
end in and of itself. That step involves modifying the doctrine that a
judgment should not be reversed if the trial court reaches the correct
result for the wrong reason.1 3 2 Invoking that doctrine to sustain a
judgment may be appropriate in a number of areas13 3 but pleading is
not one of them. Use of the doctrine in the pleading context hardly
serves the ends of justice. It instead operates to deprive the plaintiff
of an opportunity that he would have had but for the trial court's er-
ror: the opportunity to amend his petition to state a cause of action.
A general demurrer is often based on more than one ground.
Although the defendant will inevitably argue that each one of those
grounds independently establishes that the petition fails to state a
cause of action, the trial court may sustain the demurrer on only one
of those grounds and either explicitly reject or say nothing about the
remainder. In deciding how to respond, the plaintiff will necessarily
focus on the ground cited by the trial court and ignore the remain-
131. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54, 68.
132. See, e.g., Harmon Care Centers, Inc. v. Knight, 215 Neb. 779, 783-84, 340 N.W.2d
872, 875 (1983); Schmitt v. City of Omaha, 191 Neb. 608, 611-12, 217 N.W.2d 86, 89
(1974); Morse v. Mayberry, 183 Neb. 89, 91-92, 157 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1968).
133. The doctrine is grounded in notions of judicial efficiency. "It would be wasteful
to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already
made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on an-
other ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate." SEC v. Che-
nery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). For example, if the trial court enters a
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence
on one element of his cause of action and the appellate court concludes that the
plaintiff met his burden on that element but not on another, there is no reason to
reverse and remand for a new trial. The plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment in
his favor unless he proves each element of his cause of action. Assuming that the
plaintiff knew what he was required to prove, the plaintiff cannot claim that he
was misled into believing that no such evidence was necessary. Affirming the
judgment under those circumstances would therefore be neither unjust nor
unfair.
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der.134 The reason for focusing on that ground is obvious. The litiga-
tion cannot go forward unless the trial court is satisfied that the
plaintiff has stated a cause of action.
If the defect that the trial court found in the petition is not one that
can be cured by amendment, there is no reason for the plaintiff to file
an amended petition.135 From a practical standpoint, the only conceiv-
able purpose for filing an amended petition under those circumstances
would be to eliminate grounds that the defendant cited in support of
his demurrer but which the trial court either ignored or rejected when
it sustained the demurrer. In other words, the amended petition
would add allegations that the trial court has said are unnecessary
without adding the allegations that the trial court has said are neces-
sary. That makes no sense. For all practical purposes, the plaintiff
has no choice but to appeal.
The reasons that led the trial court to sustain the demurrer there-
fore play a central role in the plaintiff's decision of whether to amend
or to appeal,13 6 a fact that the court itself recognized in Clyde v.
Buchfinck. 3 7 The plaintiffs in Clyde brought suit to recover property
that allegedly passed to them under a will. The defendants demurred
on a number of grounds. Although the trial court sustained the de-
murrers and dismissed the action, it never specified the grounds for its
decision.138 That was reversible error. In holding that a trial court
must specify the grounds for its decision when it sustains a demurrer,
the court emphasized that a trial court's failure to do so not only
makes it difficult for the court to review the case but also makes it
difficult for plaintiffs to decide whether and how to amend their
petitions.
In this case, plaintiffs requested that the trial court specify its reasons for sus-
taining the demurrers. Part of the plaintiffs' concern was that they did not
know whether the trial court had in fact construed the will and found that
they had no interest in the property under it, or whether the petitions were
134. See su~pr text following note 70.
135. Even if the defect is one that might be cured by amendment, the rules of waiver
may leave the plaintiff with no realistic alternative but to stand on his petition
and appeal the trial court's ruling. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
136. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Griffin v. Locke, 286 F.2d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1961).
137. 198 Neb. 586, 254 N.W.2d 393 (1977).
138. Clyde actually involved two cases which had been consolidated for appeal. The
plaintiffs in both cases were different and invoked different theories as to why
they were entitled to the property. The defendants in one of the cases demurred
to the petition on three grounds: (1) the petition failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, (2) there was a pending action involving the same
subject matter and the same parties, and (3) misjoinder. Id at 590,254 N.W.2d at
396. The defendants in the other case filed a general demurrer to the petition but
asserted a number of theories as to why the petition failed to state a cause of
action. I& at 593-94, 254 N.W.2d at 397. In other words, the demurrer in the
second case was also based on multiple grounds.
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defective for other reasons. Plaintiffs'failure to tender proposed amend-
ments to the petitions is understandable when they were uncertain of the
grounds on which the demurrers were sustained. Without knowing the rea-
sons for the sustaining of the demurrers, it is impossible for this court to de-
termine whether the trial court erred in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend
their petitions .... 139
Just as one can understand a plaintiff's failure to file an amended
petition when he does not know why the trial court sustained the de-
murrer, one can also understand a plaintiffs failure to file an
amended petition to cure a potential defect that the trial court never
cited as a ground for sustaining the demurrer. How the plaintiff re-
sponds, as a practical matter, depends on the grounds for the trial
court's decision. When it bases its decision on an erroneous ground,
the trial court in effect misleads the plaintiff into appealing rather
than amending. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that the
plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily elected to forego his opportunity
to amend.
In Morris,14 0 to take just one example,141 the trial court errone-
ously sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground that Mrs.
Morris' employment contract was indefinite as to time without even
alluding to the defect that the supreme court later found in the plain-
tiff's petition: the absence of a specific allegation that the grievance
committee's decision did not conflict with established hospital policy
or applicable laws and regulations.142 Because of the trial court's er-
ror, Mrs. Morris had no choice but to appeal and no reason to believe
that her allegation regarding the committee's findings was defective.
In short, the trial court's error cost Mrs. Morris her case.
If the trial court had based its decision on the correct ground, Mrs.
Morris would have had no reason to appeal. She would have been
given an opportunity to amend her petition to include the more spe-
cific allegation143 and undoubtedly would have taken advantage of
139. Id. at 594, 254 N.W.2d at 398 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs had specifically
requested that they be given leave to amend but failed to submit a proposed
amended petition. Id at 589, 254 N.W.2d at 395-96. That failure was cited by the
trial judge as a reason for dismissing the action. Id. at 591, 254 N.W.2d 396.
140. Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983). Morris
is discussed supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Harmon Care Centers, Inc. v. Knight, 215 Neb. 779, 340 N.W.2d 872
(1983) (although the trial court erred in sustaining the defendants' demurrer on
the grounds that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
the court nevertheless affirmed the judgment because the plaintiff did not prop-
erly allege the elements of either a legal or equitable accounting action); Koch v.
Grimminger, 192 Neb. 706, 223 N.W.2d 833 (1974) (although the trial erred in sus-
taining the defendant's demurrer on the ground that the defendant county attor-
ney was absolutely immune, the court nevertheless affirmed the judgment
because the plaintiff failed to allege malice properly).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
143. See, e.g., Cagle, Inc. v. Sammons, 198 Neb. 595, 604,254 N.W.2d 398, 404 (1977) (it is
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that opportunity. Including that allegation would have required Mrs.
Morris only to make explicit what was already obvious from her peti-
tion.144 But she never had the chance.
In order to ensure that plaintiffs like Mrs. Morris have a fair
chance, the court should no longer adhere to the doctrine that a cor-
rect pleading decision based upon incorrect grounds should neverthe-
less be affirmed. If the court concludes that the demurrer should have
been sustained on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court
and that there is a reasonable possibility that the defect could be cured
by amendment, the court should remand the case to give the plaintiff
the opportunity to amend his petition, an opportunity he would have
had but for the trial court's error. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
recognized in Butler v. Trentham,145 the interests of justice require no
less.
In Butler, the administrator of a decedent's estate filed an action
for contribution against two defendants. The defendants demurred on
the ground that the right of contribution did not survive the decedent.
The trial court accepted that argument and sustained the demurrer.
The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently rejected that argument
but nevertheless affirmed the judgment because the plaintiff had
failed to allege one of the elements of his cause of action. On rehear-
ing, the plaintiff argued that he would have been given leave to amend
his petition to include the necessary allegations if the defect had been
raised below. According to the plaintiff, the case therefore should
have been remanded to allow him to amend his petition so he could
have a trial on the merits.146 The supreme court agreed.
We do not know from the record before us what acts of negligence by the
Defendants can be alleged and proven as required in contribution between
joint tortfeasors. We are of the opinion that if such facts exist we should not
simply dismiss the case with the prejudice that would follow such an adjudica-
tion. Under the [Tennessee remand statute], it is proper for this Court to re-
mand a cause with leave to amend where justice requires it.
1 4 7
Despite the need to remand when the trial court sustains a demur-
an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-854 (1985).
144. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
145. 224 Tenn. 528, 458 S.W.2d 13 (1970).
146. ME at 538, 458 S.W.2d at 17.
147. Id. at 538-39, 458 S.W.2d at 17; see, e.g., Marranzano v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 184 F.2d
349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (ends of justice are better served by remanding with
leave to amend when the trial court correctly dismisses an action but for the
wrong reason).
The Tennessee remand statute on which the court relied in Butler provided:
The court shall also, in all cases, where, in its opinion, complete justice
cannot be had by reason of some defect in the record, want of proper
parties, or oversight without culpable negligence, remand the cause to
the court below for further proceedings, with proper directions to effec-
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rer for the wrong reasons, there is a practical hurdle to adopting the
approach outlined above. The approach assumes that the court will
know the grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.
That may not often be true.148 Trial judges in Nebraska are not re-
quired to state their grounds in writing and there is a significant possi-
bility that the parties may provide the court with conflicting
statements of those grounds. This hurdle is by no means insurmount-
able, however. Pursuant to its supervisory authority over the trial
courts,149the supreme court could promulgate a supreme court rule
requiring trial court judges to specify in writing the grounds on which
they base a decision to sustain a demurrer and further requiring that
the trial judge's specification be included in the transcript.150
To summarize, the admonition that the amendment provisions of
tuate the objects of the order, and upon such terms as may be deemed
right.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-3-128 (1980). Nebraska does not have a comparable statu-
tory provision. That does not mean, however, that the court cannot reverse and
remand when the trial court reaches the correct result for the wrong reason. A
trial court commits a legal error when it bases its decision on an erroneous
ground, and the supreme court is statutorily vested with the power to reverse
judgments for legal errors. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1911 (1985) ("A judgment
rendered... may be reversed ... by the Supreme Court for errors appearing on
the record."). Furthermore, if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
could be remedied by amendment, the harmless error rule would not preclude
remanding the case. The error under those circumstances would clearly be preju-
dicial. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. More generally, the court
has the power to remand a case with leave to amend even if the trial court did not
commit any legal error. See supra note 46.
148. See Clyde v. Buchfinck, 198 Neb. 586, 595, 254 N.W.2d 393, 398 (1977) (Boslaugh,
J., dissenting).
149. Section 25 of Article V of the Nebraska Constitution provides: "For the effectual
administration of justice and the prompt disposition of judicial proceedings, the
supreme court may promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all courts, uni-
form as to each class of courts, and not in conflict with laws governing such mat-
ters .... NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25. Because a rule requiring district and county
court judges to state in writing the grounds on which they sustain a demurrer
would not conflict with any statutes currently in effect, § 25 clearly empowers the
court to promulgate such a rule.
Although promulgating a supreme court rule to govern practice in the trial
courts may seem to be a somewhat unusual approach, the court has previously
exercised its power under § 25 on a number of occasions. See, e.g., NEB. S. CT.
REv. RULES 4.1 (establishing rules for practice in Nebraska state courts by certi-
fied senior law students), 9.1 (establishing case progression timetables), 11.1 (au-
thorizing district courts to hold pretrial conferences in civil actions), 12.1 (setting
forth, inter alia, the duties and qualifications of court reporters), 13.1 (establish-
ing rules for the release, substitution, and disposal of exhibits), 16.1 (adopting
notice forms for use by county courts in probate, guardianship, conservatorship,
and trust cases) (1986).
150. The rule proposed in the text could be worded in any number of ways. One way
in which it could be worded is:
Pursuant to § 25 of article V of the Nebraska Constitution, it is hereby
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section 25-854 should be liberally construed to prevent injustice' 5 '
takes on a rather hollow ring in light of the practice of affirming
pleading appeals on grounds other than those relied on by the trial
court. One of the primary purposes of section 25-854 is to give a plain-
tiff the opportunity to correct pleading defects, an opportunity that, at
least in theory, minimizes the risk that cases will be decided on the
basis of pleading technicalities rather than on their merits. Especially
in a code pleading jurisdiction like Nebraska, that opportunity is es-
sential and its availability should not depend on whether the plaintiff
is blessed with a trial judge who reaches the correct result for the cor-
rect reason.
III. IF ONLY I KNEW WHAT TO PROVE
The danger that a case will turn on ability to foresee the unforesee-
able does not end at the pleading stage of the litigation. A defendant
can mount a challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition at
any time.152 In fact, the defendant can challenge the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's petition for the first time on appeal even though he never
demurred in the trial court. 5 3 Challenging the sufficiency of a peti-
tion after the case has been tried is generally frowned on and will
most likely fail if the challenge is based on a technical pleading de-
fect.15 4 That is not true, however, when the challenge is based on the
ordered that the following be adopted as a rule of practice for the county
and district courts of this state:
(1) Whenever a demurrer to a petition is sustained, the judge shall
issue a written order stating each and every ground upon which the de-
murrer is sustained. Those grounds shall be concisely stated but with
sufficient detail to enable the parties and the appellate court to under-
stand the basis for the judge's decision.
(2) Whenever an appeal shall be taken from a judgment of dismissal
entered after the sustaining of a demurrer, the judge's written order
shall be included in the transcript.
Because the trial judge's written statement of the grounds for his decision is
analogous to a memorandum opinion, it would have to be included in the tran-
script. See NEB. S. CT. REv. RULES 4(A)(1)(b) (1986).
151. See Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178, 183, 302 N.W.2d 697,
701 (1981).
152. E.g., In re Reler Trust, 193 Neb. 54, 55, 225 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1975).
153. See Vielehr v. Malone, 158 Neb. 436, 438, 63 N.W.2d 497, 501 (1954); Sallander v.
Prairie Life Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 629, 632, 200 N.W. 344, 345 (1924).
154. If a challenge to sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition is not mounted until either
trial or appeal, the petition will be liberally construed and deemed sufficient if at
all possible. See, e.g., Contois Motor Co. v. Saltz, 198 Neb. 455, 461-62, 253 N.W.2d
290, 294 (1977); Bader v. Hodwalker, 187 Neb. 138,139, 187 N.W.2d 645, 646 (1971);
Gibbs v. Johns, 183 Neb. 618, 619-20, 163 N.W.2d 110, 111 (1968). In addition, the
court has sharply curtailed the use of a demurrer ore tenus- at least when a
pretrial conference is held. See Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb.
178, 302 N.W.2d 697 (1981).
In Newman Grove, the plaintiff demurred ore tenus to the defendant's answer
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failure to allege and prove an essential element of the cause of action.
Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving each element of
his cause of action, the defendant may mount his challenge indirectly
by arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove one or more of those ele-
ments. No one introduces all of the evidence that is potentially rele-
vant to his case. Litigants instead decide what to introduce in light of
what they are required to prove. If the supreme court has never held
that a particular fact is an element of the plaintiff's cause of action, the
plaintiff may reasonably conclude that he need not marshall and in-
troduce any evidence of that fact, especially if the defendant never
demurred to the petition on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege
that fact. The plaintiff may then proceed to trial and prevail on the
merits of his claim only to have the supreme court later reverse the
judgment and dismiss the action because he failed to introduce evi-
dence on one of the essential elements of his cause of action. In other
words, the plaintiff may lose his case simply because he failed to intro-
duce evidence that he had no reason to believe he was required to in-
troduce. That is precisely what happened in Nerud v. Haybuster Afg.,
Inc.1 55
A. The Unfairness of Applying New Proof Requirements Retroactively
Mr. Nerud bought a haystacking machine for his farm in 1976.
While Mr. Nerud was working in the fields, the machine was com-
pletely destroyed when it suddenly burst into flames. Three days
later, Mr. Nerud bought a second haystacker that lasted a few hours
before it also burst into flames.1 5 6 Mr. Nerud subsequently filed suit
against the manufacturer, alleging that the haystackers were negli-
gently designed.157 The trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr.
on the ground that it defectively pleaded the affirmative defense of duress. The
plaintiff neither filed a timely demurrer to the answer nor questioned the suffi-
ciency of the defendant's allegations at the pretrial conference. The plaintiff in-
stead raised the issue for the first time at trial by demurring ore tenus after he
rested. In holding that the trial court should have overruled the demurrer ore
tenus, the court emphasized that pretrial conferences are designed to "avoid traps
and surprises," id, at 183, 302 N.W.2d at 701, quoting Jamison v. Lloyd, 51 Mich.
App. 570, 573, 215 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Ct. App. 1974), and that counsel "cannot sit
idly by and then for the first time interpose objections at trial." Id. at 183, 302
N.W.2d at 701, quoting State Highway Comm'n v. Redmon, 42 Mich. App. 642,
646, 202 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Ct. App. 1972). Rather than demurring ore tenus, the
plaintiff should have challenged the sufficiency of the defendant's pleading by a
timely demurrer. Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178, 183, 302
N.W.2d 697, 701 (1981).
155. 215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369 (1983).
156. Id- at 606, 340 N.W.2d at 371.
157. Although Nerud actually involved two suits-one for each machine-that had
been consolidated for trial and appeal, id at 605, 340 N.W.2d at 371, the legal
theories on which Mr. Nerud proceeded were the same in both suits: negligence
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Nerud.158 The supreme court reversed the judgment, however, and
remanded the case with instructions that the action be dismissed be-
cause Mr. Nerud had failed to introduce any evidence of a feasible al-
ternative design that the manufacturer could have employed to
produce a safer haystacker.159
While it might be tempting to attribute the absence of any such
evidence to poor trial preparation on Mr. Nerud's part, the fact is Mr.
Nerud had no reason to believe that any such evidence was necessary.
The defendants never demurred to Mr. Nerud's petition on the ground
that it failed to allege that the haystackers could have been designed
more safely.16o Furthermore, they never raised the issue in either a
motion to dismiss at the close of Mr. Nerud's case or a motion for a
new trial after the judge rendered a decision for Mr. Nerud.161 They
instead raised the issue for the first time on appeal-and then only in
passing.'6
2
The defendant's relative silence on the issue of whether Mr. Nerud
was required to prove the feasibility of an alternative design is some-
what understandable given the absence of any Nebraska precedent
imposing such a requirement. As the court itself admitted in Nerud,
"[W]e have not heretofore specifically adopted a rule requiring the
plaintiff in a negligent design case to demonstrate how the defectively
in designing the haystacker, negligence in manufacturing the haystacker, strict
liability for producing and marketing a defective product, breach of express war-
ranty, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. I&d at 606, 340
N.W.2d at 371. The dealer and the manufacturer were named as defendants in
both suits, and, in both suits, the dealer filed an indemnification cross claim
against the manufacturer. Id- at 606, 340 N.W.2d at 372.
158. In both suits, the trial court returned a verdict against the manufacturer on negli-
gence grounds. The trial court also returned a verdict against the dealer in the
second suit on breach of warranty grounds. The trial court rejected the warranty
theory in the first suit, however, because the claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. I& at 608, 340 N.W.2d at 372-73.
159. I& at 613, 340 N.W.2d at 375. The court invoked the same requirement to hold
that Mr. Nerud could not recover on a strict liability theory. I& at 614-15, 340
N.W.2d at 375. This was the first time that the court specifically said that a plain-
tiff who attempts to hold a manufacturer strictly liable for a design defect must
prove that there were feasible alternative designs that would have made the
product safer. See id. at 614-15, 340 N.W.2d at 375-76; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 167-70. Although the court did uphold the warranty verdict in the
second suit, Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 616, 340 N.W.2d 369, 376
(1983), the net effect of the court's decision was to bar Mr. Nerud from any recov-
ery for the first haystacker. In light of the court's split decision, it would not be
inaccurate to say that Mr. Nerud lost his case.
160. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with James Ellison, Esq. (Aug. 14,
1986) (on file in Rm. 213 of Univ. Neb. College of Law) [hereinafter Ellison
Memo]. Mr. Ellison represented Mr. Nerud in the litigation.
161. Id at 1.
162. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc. at 32, Nerud v.
Haybuster Mfg., Inc. 215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369 (1983).
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designed product could be made safer, and ... there is a paucity of
precedent on this question in Nebraska ... "163 In fact, as the follow-
ing discussion illustrates, the little existing case law suggested that
there was no such requirement.
Although the court in Nerud said that its 1979 decision in Hancock
v. Paccar, Inc.164 "hinted at"165 the requirement that there be evi-
dence of feasible alternative designs, "hinted at" may be too strong a
characterization. The plaintiff in Paccar filed suit against a truck
manufacturer, alleging that the truck's bumper had been negligently
and defectively designed. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. On
appeal, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict on both a negligence theory and a strict liability theory
and therefore affirmed the judgment.166 One of the many arguments
that the court addressed in the course of its twenty-two page opinion
was the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the judgment on strict liability grounds because the
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant's design did not comply
with the "state of the art" in bumper designs.167 The court rejected
that argument:
We believe... that Paccar misconstrues what constitutes the state of the art
and how it applies in a strict liability case. While the jury may consider, as
evidence of the state of the art, the fact that no manufacturer is doing that
which it is claimed could be done, such evidence will not establish conclusively
the state of the art. Obviously, the inaction of all the manufacturers in an area
should not be the standard by which the state of the art should be deter-
mined ....... The question therefore is not whether anyone else was doing
more, although that may be considered, but whether the evidence disclosed
that anything more could reasonably and economically be done.... The jury
was not required to accept any of those suggestions. Nevertheless, those were
questions of fact which the jury had to resolve.
1 6 8
This language is susceptible to a number of interpretations. One
interpretation is that a plaintiff alleging a defective design must prove
that feasible alternative designs existed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is proceeding on a negligence or strict liability theory. That
interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the language was di-
rected exclusively to the plaintiff's strict liability claim. Another in-
terpretation is that, at least in strict liability cases, a plaintiff must
prove that feasible alternative designs existed. That interpretation,
however, can be questioned on the ground that the court seemed to be
doing nothing more than responding to the defendant's argument on a
factual as opposed to a substantive level. In other words, the court was
163. Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 612, 340 N.W.2d 369, 374 (1983).
164. 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25 (1979).
165. Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 612, 340 N.W.2d 369, 374 (1983).
166. Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 478-79, 283 N.W.2d 25, 34 (1979).
167. Id. at 479, 283 N.W.2d at 34-35.
168. Id. at 479-80, 283 N.W.2d at 35 (emphasis added).
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merely saying that the evidence the defendant claimed should have
been introduced was in fact introduced; the court never said that evi-
dence of feasible alternative designs must be introduced in a strict lia-
bility action.1
69
The most reasonable interpretation of Paccar is that a plaintiff, if
proceeding on a negligence theory, must establish that the product
was negligently designed, or, if proceeding on a strict liability theory,
must establish that the product was defectively designed. One way-
but by no means the only way-of making the required showing is to
prove that there was a feasible alternative design that would have
made the product safer. That broad interpretation of Paccar becomes
even more reasonable in light of what the court said in rejecting the
defendant's overall argument that the plaintiff's evidence was insuffi-
cient to sustain the judgment:
An examination of the entire record, however, would appear to create ques-
tions of fact on either cause of action. Plaintiff's expert testified that in his
opinion the bumper was negligently and defectively designed in a number of
ways, any one of which, if believed by the jury, could have established the
proximate cause of the injury. It was at best a "t'is and t'aint" argument and
for the jury to resolve.... We cannot say from a reading of the record that the
jury did not act as reasonable people or did not reach a reasonable
conclusion. 170
When read in its entirety, the court's opinion in Paccar rather
clearly suggests that an expert's opinion that the product was negli-
gently or defectively designed would be sufficient. To the extent that
Paccar sent a faint signal that the plaintiff must also introduce evi-
dence of feasible alternative designs, the court sent a very different-
and much stronger-signal two years later when it decided Morris v.
Chrysler Corp.171 There, the plaintiff proceeded on a negligence the-
169. When analyzing a supreme court decision, a lawyer cannot always assume that
the decision in fact says what it may seem to say. For example, in Kohler v. Ford
Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971), the court quoted a jury instruc-
tion providing that, in order to recover in strict liability, the plaintiff must prove
that he "was unaware of the claimed defect." Id at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 607.
Although the court did not specifically say that it disapproved of the instruction,
it did not specifically say that it approved of the instruction. Therefore, a lawyer
reading the Kohler opinion could have easily come to the conclusion that lack of
knowledge is an essential element of strict liability. In fact, that is precisely how
the court interpreted Kohler six years later. Waegli v. Caterpiller Tractor Co.,
197 Neb. 824, 826, 251 N.W.2d 370, 372 (1977). In Paccar, however, the court held
that lack of knowledge is not an element that the plaintiff must prove. In doing
so, the court explained away Kohler on the ground that the court did not specifi-
cally rule on the instruction at issue and explained away Waegli on the ground
that the court did not specifically rule on the question of whether lack of knowl-
edge is an element of the cause of action or an affirmative defense. Hancock v.
Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 484-85, 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (1979).
170. Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 478-79, 283 N.W.2d 25, 34 (1979) (emphasis
added).
171. 208 Neb. 341, 303 N.W.2d 500 (1981).
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ory and alleged that the engine in his car was defective.172 The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant ar-
gued that the plaintiff's evidence of negligence was insufficient be-
cause the plaintiff merely established that the engine was defective.
The court flatly rejected that argument:
'[O]f course, negligence is never presumed.' . . . However, negligence is a
question of fact and it may be proved by circumstantial evidence.... We have
not yet dealt with this specific question in Nebraska; however, the weight of
authority holds that although proof of product defectiveness is not conclusive
as to negligence, it is evidence of negligence on the part of the manufacturer
of the product....
The appellant presented competent evidence in support of all the neces-
sary elements of his negligence action. He established ... that the engine was
defectively manufactured and placed on the market.... Appellant has carried
his burden and is entitled to recover damages prayed for.1 7 3
Two years later, the court in Nerud brushed Morris aside by say-
ing: "Morris, however is distinguishable from the cases at hand. Mor-
ris presented a manufacturing defect. These cases do not."174 That
distinction is certainly defensible but the fact remains that the court
did not limit the broad language of Morris until it decided Nerud. In
light of what the court said-and did not say-in Morris and Paccar,
Mr. Nerud could not reasonably have foreseen the requirement that
the court adopted for the first time in his case. The requirement-that
a plaintiff must prove the existence of feasible alternative designs in
order to establish that the product was negligently designed-was in
effect a new requirement. Nevertheless, the court invoked that newly
announced requirement, not to reverse and remand for a new trial,
but to reverse and remand with instructions that the action be
dismissed.175
What happened to Mr. Nerud is basically no different than what
happened to Mrs. Knapp and Mrs. Morris and the appropriate re-
sponse should likewise be no different. By holding that Mr. Nerud
was required to introduce evidence of feasible alternative designs, the
court in effect held that the existence of such designs is an element of
a cause of action for negligent design. Whether that kind of holding
comes in the context of a pleading appeal or an evidentiary appeal is
irrelevant. In either situation, the case is not being decided on its mer-
its. It is instead being decided on a party's ability to foresee and re-
172. Id at 343, 303 N.W.2d at 502.
173. Id. at 345, 303 N.W.2d at 503, quoting Porter v. Black, 205 Neb. 699, 705, 289
N.W.2d 760, 764 (1980) (emphasis added). The plaintiff's evidence on the issue of
whether the engine was defective consisted of the testimony of a mechanic that
the engine crankshaft failed because one of the bearings had not been installed at
the factory. Id, at 342, 303 N.W.2d at 502.
174. Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 610, 340 N.W.2d 369, 373 (1983).
175. See id. at 612-15, 340 N.W.2d at 375-76.
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spond to the unforeseeable.176 Cases, however, should not turn on
whether a litigant is lucky enough to have a finely polished crystal
ball. When announcing a new proof requirement-that is, one that
the plaintiff could not have reasonably foreseen-the court therefore
should not dispose of the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
comply with that newly announced requirement. The court should in-
stead remand the case for a new trial.
It should be emphasized that the proposal does not call for remand-
ing every case in which there is a failure of proof. If the court con-
cludes that a plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence of
causation in a negligence action, for example, the court should reverse
the judgment with instructions that the action be dismissed even
though the plaintiff might be able to muster sufficient evidence in a
second trial. The plaintiff knew from the beginning what he was re-
quired to prove,177 and had ample opportunity to marshall the neces-
sary evidence. The goal here is not to give the plaintiff a second
chance. The goal is much more basic: to give the plaintiff a chance.
In order to ensure that the plaintiff is given a chance rather than a
second chance, a finding that the newly announced proof requirement
is not one that the plaintiff could have reasonably foreseen would be a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a new trial. Remand would
be appropriate only if there were no other ground for disposing of the
case-for example, the plaintiff failed to prove one or more of the re-
maining elements of his cause of action. Under those circumstances,
the plaintiff would not be harmed by the absence of any warning of
the new proof requirement; he would have lost his case in any
event. 78
Just like the proposal to remand pleading cases of first impression,
the proposal to remand proof cases of first impression is not without
precedent. In Aiken v. Clary,179 for example, the Missouri Supreme
Court specifically held for the first time that a plaintiff must introduce
expert testimony in a medical malpractice action based on inadequate
disclosure. Although the plaintiff failed to introduce any such testi-
176. If Mr. Nerud had known that he was required to prove the existence of feasible
alternative designs, he would have developed and introduced the necessary evi-
dence. Ellison Memo, supra note 162, at 1.
177. There has never been any doubt about the plaintiff's obligation to prove causation
in order to recover. See, e.g., Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 216, 99 N.W.2d 16, 21
(1959).
178. In other words, the absence of notice is akin to harmless error. The commission
of a harmless error-that is, a nonprejudicial error that did not affect the out-
come of the case-is not a ground for reversal. See, e.g., Fuel Explor., Inc. v.
Novotny, 221 Neb. 17, 25, 374 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1985); Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan
Mercy Hosp., 191 Neb. 224, 227,214 N.W.2d 490, 492-93 (1974); Van Ornum v. Mo-
ran 186 Neb. 418, 423, 183 N.W.2d 759, 763 (1971).
179. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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mony, 8 0 the court did not dispose of the case on that ground. Empha-
sizing that one of its earlier decisions had used language that could
support a reasonable inference that expert testimony was not re-
quired, the court concluded that the interests of justice instead re-
quired remanding the case for a new trial in order to allow the
plaintiff to introduce that testimony. 181
Admittedly, remanding a case after a full trial would involve a
greater expenditure of judicial resources than remanding a case after
a demurrer. To the extent that our goal is to ensure that parties have
a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims on the merits, how-
ever, that is an expenditure well worth making.
B. The Strange Case of Damages
What makes cases like Nerud so baffling is that if Mr. Nerud had
been lucky enough to introduce evidence of alternative designs but
sloppy enough to introduce a smattering of evidence on damages, the
result might well have been different. Because proof of the amount of
damages is an essential element of a plaintiffs cause of action,
1 8 2 it is
not surprising to find a number of cases that have been dismissed be-
cause the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence on dam-
ages.1 8 3 It is somewhat surprising, however, to find a number of cases
180. I& at 673.
181. Id. at 676; see, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114, 123 (5th Cir. 1983)
(adopting new rule regarding the adjustment of loss of future earnings awards for
inflation and reversing and remanding case for new trial on damages). Prior to
its decision in Aiken, the Missouri Supreme Court had held that expert testimony
was unnecessary in a malpractice action in which the defendants allegedly failed
to warn the plaintiff of the risks associated with shock therapy. Mitchell v.
Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 16-17 (Mo. 1960). The court in Aiken distinguished
Mitchell on the ground that the "factual situation in the Mitchell case was differ-
ent from that here, plaintiff there contending that the doctors made no disclosure
of the risks and the doctors testifying that they did make full disclosure to the
patient." Aiken v. Clarey, 396 S.W.2d 688, 673-74 (Mo. 1965) (emphasis in origi-
nal). Although Mitchell did not specifically address the question of whether ex-
pert testimony would be required in other types of inadequate disclosure cases,
the court in Aiken admitted that its decision in Mitchell did inferentially suggest
that no such testimony would be required. Id. at 674. The same could be said of
the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Morris and the issue of whether proof
of alternative feasible designs was required in negligent design cases. See supra
notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
The approach that the Missouri Supreme Court took in Aiken-remanding
the case for a new trial-stands in sharp contrast to the approach the Nebraska
Supreme Court took when it announced for the first time that expert testimony
must be introduced in medical malpractice cases. See Tady v. Warta, 111 Neb. 521,
196 N.W. 901 (1924) (affirming judgment because plaintiff failed to introduce ex-
pert medical testimony on the issue of the defendant doctor's negligence).
182. E.g., Midlands Transp. Co. v. Apple Lines, Inc., 188 Neb. 435, 440, 197 N.W.2d 646,
648 (1972).
183. Scoular-Bishop Grain Co. v. Basset Grain, Inc., 218 Neb. 280, 352 N.W.2d 904
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that have been remanded for a new trial in order to give the plaintiff a
second chance to prove damages.18 4 These two lines of cases are like
ships passing in the night. They neither acknowledge each other nor
explain why they reach different results.18 5
Perhaps these ships continue passing each other without signaling
because the court is not comfortable with either approach and there-
fore moves back and forth between them. On one hand, if the plaintiff
establishes that he was in fact wronged, the law ought to afford him a
remedy. On the other hand, the plaintiff had his chance. As Justice
Caporale once said: "Almost, but not quite, proving the measure of
recovery should be treated no differently than almost, but not quite,
proving the right to recover."
18 6
Although the choice between remanding and dismissing is not an
easy one to make, dismissal is the better approach in such cases. Most
plaintiffs file suit with an eye toward money damages. Giving a plain-
tiff a second chance to prove damages might well encourage over-
reaching the first time around. The plaintiff would have nothing to
lose and everything to gain by making an inflated damage claim that
rested more on speculative causal links than on a firm factual founda-
tion. There is no reason to create such an incentive. The plaintiff
knew from the very beginning that he would be required to introduce
competent evidence to establish the amount of his damages. If he
could have introduced more evidence the first time around but failed
to do so, he has no one to blame but himself.
IV. CONCLUSION
In many ways, this Article has been the story of three people-
Grace Knapp, Lee Ann Morris, and Frank Nerud-who were all
treated less than fairly by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The purpose
of recounting the story is not to criticize the court for the way it dis-
posed of Knapp, Morris, and Nerud, but to underscore the conse-
quences of changing some procedural rules without carefully
analyzing how those changes will affect the system overall. By en-
grafting a twentieth century approach to res judicata onto a nine-
(1984); Meisinger Earth Moving, Inc. v. State, 212 Neb. 554, 324 N.W.2d 387 (1982);
Dana F. Cole & Co. v. Byerly, 211 Neb. 903, 320 N.W.2d 916 (1982); Settel's, Inc. v.
Pitney Bowes, Inc., 209 Neb. 26, 305 N.W.2d 896 (1981).
184. Nekuda v. Vincent, 213 Neb. 527, 330 N.W.2d 477 (1983); LeRoy Weyant & Sons,
Inc. v. Harvey, 212 Neb. 65, 321 N.W.2d 429 (1982); Stanek v. Swierczek, 209 Neb.
357, 307 N.W.2d 807 (1981); Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804
(1974).
185. This is not the only instance of conflicting lines of cases in Nebraska. See Fenner,
Circumstantial Evidence in Nebraska, 19 CREIGHTON L. REv. 236 (1986) (discuss-
ing the four lines of circumstantial evidence cases in Nebraska).
186. LeRoy Weyant & Sons, Inc. v. Harvey, 212 Neb. 65, 69, 321 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1982)
(Caporale, J., dissenting).
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teenth century approach to pleading, the court has inadvertently
transformed Nebraska's procedural system into one which assumes
that litigants are blessed with finely polished crystal balls. While that
transformation may not have been immediately apparent, it has be-
come increasingly apparent over time, and so has the need to make
some adjustments in order to bring Nebraska's procedural system
back into step with reality.
The adjustments necessary to accomplish that are relatively minor.
They only involve modifying the rules that have traditionally gov-
erned pleading and proof appeals in order to accommodate the proce-
dural system's basic objective: ensuring that litigants have a
meaningful opportunity to obtain a resolution of their claims on the
merits. Litigants cannot comply with pleading and proof require-
ments that they have no reason to believe exist.
